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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years the Washington courts have viewed with increasing
disfavor the application of caveat emptor to sales of real property.1
With respect to new buildings, the courts have moved from recogniz-
ing an implied warranty of habitability in contracts to build struc-
tures,2 purely a builder's warranty,3 to recognizing an implied war-
1. For an explanation of the caveat emptor doctrine, see Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 383.
390 n.12 (1969). For a discussion of the decline of caveat emptor, see 45 WASH. L. REV.
670(1970).
2. See Fain v. Nelson, 57 Wn. 2d 217, 356 P.2d 302 (1960): Hoye v. Century Build-
ers, Inc., 52 Wn. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958).
3. In Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 52 Wn. 2d 830. 329 P.2d 474 (1958). the court
explained the builder's warranty as follows: "[i] t seems to be well settled that where 'a
person holds himself out as specially qualified to perform work of a particular charac-
ter, there is an implied warranty that the work which he undertakes shall be of proper
workmanship and reasonable fitness for its intended use'..... Id. at 833, 329 P.2d at
476. This warranty is given only by the builder who furnishes building plans. When they
are furnished by someone else, that person impliedly warrants that the plans are suffi-
cient. See, e.g., Prier v. Refrigeration Eng'r Co., 74 Wn. 2d 25, 442 P.2d 621 (1968).
Thus the builder who adequately follows such plans is not liable for defects caused by
them; rather, he is liable only for defects caused by his own workmanship. Clark v.
Fowler, 58 Wn. 2d 435, 439, 363 P.2d 812, 815 (1961).
The Washington cases dealing with new house warranties do not make this distinc-
tion. Liability is imposed on the builder-vendor not only when he is directly responsible
for defects, but apparently on a strict liability basis also. See note 76 infra. However.
the cases involving the new house warranty have all involved situations where the
builder-vendor was responsible for the plans of the houses involved. If the defect which
breached the warranty arose from a design for which the builder-vendor had no
responsibility, a different question would present itself, and the limits of strict liability
in this area would be tested.
There is some indication that Washington courts would construe the warranty
broadly in the above situation; in other words, the warranty may impose liability on
builder-vendors for housing defects regardless of whether they are attributable to design
or construction. In House v. Thornton, 76 Wn. 2d 428, 457 P.2d 199 (1969) (dictum),
the court declared, "When the foundation of a house cracks ... it is no longer fit for its
intended purpose .... This, of course, is true whether the danger arises from instability
of the land ...or from defects in the foundation's design, installation, fabrication or
composition." Id. at 435, 457 P.2d at 203. Thus, despite cases such as Clark v. Fowler.
58 Wn. 2d 435, 363 P.2d 812 (1961), Washington courts may intend that the builder-
vendor be liable to the buyer for defects attributable to the designer, soils engineer, or
material suppliers, for example. On the other hand, the House court also noted that
equity demanded builder-vendor accountability because the builder-vendor made the
harm possible. 76 Wn. 2d at 435, 457 P.2d at 204. In a case involving an architect's de-
fective design, for instance, such a premise would not be applicable and a different con-
clusion might well be reached.
If a conclusion of strict liability is reached, however, the courts will have to permit the
builder-vendor to obtain indemnity from the party at fault if consistency with other
holdings on builder liability is to be maintained. See, e.g., Clark v. Fowler, 58 Wn. 2d
435, 363 P.2d 812 (1961). In this way, a builder-vendor would occupy a position similar
to that of a retailer who is directly liable to a buyer for damages arising from defective
goods sold, but who may maintain an action for indemnity against a manufacturer or
other third party who is causally at fault. It should be recognized that this position has
not yet been clearly adopted by the Washington courts. The new house warranty has not
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ranty of habitability in the sale of new houses, a warranty affecting
both builders and vendors. 4 In recognizing such warranties, the
Washington courts have joined an expanding number of jurisdictions
in responding to the realities of the housing marketplace:
These cases, reflecting a change in the morals of the market place,
more specifically rest their holdings on the ground that the underlying
theory of caveat emptor, predicating an arm's length transaction be-
tween seller and buyer of comparable skill and experience, is unrealis-
tic as applied to the sale of new houses. The courts of this persuasion
recognize that the essence of the transaction is an implicit engagement
upon the part of the seller to transfer a house suitable for habitation. It
is also recognized that the purchaser is not in an equal bargaining po-
sition with the builder-seller of a new house and is forced to rely upon
the latter's skill and knowledge with respect to the ingredients of an
adequately constructed dwelling house.5
This comment examines the status in Washington of the implied
warranty of habitability as applied to the sale of new houses. The
comment will explore the identity of the builder-vendor, the general
nature of the warranty, and its specific elements. The Washington
warranty is contrasted to those of other jurisdictions, suggestions are
made for its modification, and a model statutory warranty is pro-
posed.6
been applied to a set of facts in which the builder-vendor was not responsible for the de-
fect which gave rise to liability. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this comment, a literal
reading of the Washington new house warranty is used, on the assumption that the
courts are in fact applying that warranty on a strict liability basis. The builder-vendor's
opportunities for indemnity actions against designers, engineers, or material suppliers
are beyond the scope of this comment.
4. Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wn. 2d 567, 554 P.2d 1349 (1976); House v. Thornton, 76
Wn. 2d 428, 457 P.2d 199 (1969); Allen v. Anderson, 16 Wn. App. 446, 557 P.2d 24
(1976); Gay v. Cornwall, 6 Wn. App. 595, 494 P.2d 1371 (1972). The Washington legis-
lature is considering home warranty legislation. See Proposed Act Relating to Home
Warranties: Hearings on H-2603178 Before the House Financial Institutions Commit-
tee, 45th Legislature (1978) (draft of proposed act on file with Washington Law Re-
view). See also text accompanying notes 159-76 infra (proposed model warranty).
5. Yepsen v. Burgess, 269 Or. 635, 525 P.2d 1019, 1021-22 (1974).
6. For a discussion of alternate recovery theories, see Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 383
(1969). See also Brown v. Charlton, 90 Wn. 2d 362, 583 P.2d 1188 (1978) (Washington
Consumer Protection Act can apply to private contracts); Salois v. Mutual of Omaha
Ins. Co., 90 Wn. 2d 355, 581 P.2d 1349 (1978) (same result); Allen v. Anderson, 16 Wn.
App. 446, 557 P.2d. 24 (plaintiff complaining of defective apartment building was not
allowed to bring a claim under the Washington Consumer Protection Act because it
does not apply to private contracts for isolated sale of realty). But see Testo v. Russ
Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 16 Wn. App. 39, 554 P.2d 349 (1976) (Washington Con-
sumer Protection Act can apply to private contracts).
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II. WHAT IS A BUILDER-VENDOR?
In the new house warranty area, courts impose liability for breach
of warranty 7 upon the "builder-vendor." This term sometimes refers
to a builder who both builds and sells a house which he owns;8 it also
refers to a seller who owns the land, and/or the builder he hires to
erect a house upon it.9 Because the same term can refer to distinguish-
able parties, it is difficult to tell upon whom liability might be im-
posed in any given jurisdiction.
In Washington, liability is imposed upon all parties:10 the builder
who is also a seller" and the nonbuilder seller who hires a builder.12
7. This comment purposely speaks of the "warranty," rather than specifying war-
ranty types such as "warranty of habitability," because the exact nature of the new house
warranty is not clear. Though the courts purportedly impose a warranty of
"habitability," "fitness," or "suitability," see note 37 infra, they include within that term
the distinguishable warranty of workmanlike quality, see Part IV-E-2 infra, and per-
haps, a materials warranty, see note 3 supra. Thus, when breach of the "implied war-
ranty of habitability" is found, it is not clear whether there was a breach of habitability.
a breach of workmanlike quality, or a breach of materials warranty. It is only clear that
the new house warranty, whatever its exact nature, has been breached.
8. See, e.g., Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 449 S:W.2d 922, 923 (1970); Elmore
v. Blume, 31 111. App. 3d 643, 334 N.E.2d 431, 432 (1975); Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa.
118, 123, 288 A.2d 771, 774 n.10 (1972); Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 175
S.E.2d 792, 794 (1970); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d
803, 809 (1967); 7 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 926A, at 810 (3d ed. 1963).
9. See, e.g., Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 115
Cal. Rptr. 648 (1974); Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972);
Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968); Bolkum v. Staab, 133 Vt. 467, 346
A.2d 210 (1975); 7 S. WILLISTON, supra note 8, § 926A, at 810.
10. Once a party obtains a judgment against the builder-vendor he may seek pay-
ment from the $4,000 contractor's bond required by R.C.W. § 18.27.040. The bond may
be used to pay "all amounts that may be adjudged against the contractor by reason of
negligent or improper work." WASH. REV. CODE § 18.27.040 (Supp. 1977).
The statute does not fully protect a house buyer, however. Only one bond is required
and employee labor claims precede all others. Also, the statute is ambiguous. One part
provides that "any person having a claim against the contractor for any of the items re-
ferred to" may bring suit upon the bond. This language includes buyers under a sales
contract who obtain judgments. Yet the section which determines claim priority men-
tions only "part[ies] to the construction contract," WASH. REV. CODE § 18.27.040(2)
(Supp. 1977), thus seemingly excluding buyers under a sales contract.
This ambiguity should be rectified. The statute should protect the person who con-
tracts with the builder, whether he is a developer who hires a builder to construct a
house, and is thus a party to the construction contract, or a buyer who purchases under a
sales contract directly from a builder who owned and erected the house without a con-
struction contract.
11. See KIos v. Gockel, 87 Wn. 2d 567, 554 P.2d 1349 (1976). In Kios, the defen-
dant builder who both owned the land and sold the house was considered for "builder-
vendor" status. She was deemed a nonbuilder-vendor'only because her sale was not a
commercial one. See Part IV-D infra.
12. Allen v. Anderson, 16 Wn. App. 446, 557 P.2d 24 (1976), provides a possible
contradiction. The jury instructions were phrased solely in terms of the builder, stating
that "when the builder of a new building sells it ... he impliedly warrants .... " Id. at
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This can be seen from an examination of House v. Thornton13 and
Gay v. Cornwall.14 In House, Headley owned the land and arranged
with Thornton, a builder, to erect a house. Though the court used the
term "vendor-builder" when referring to both of them, Thornton did
not own the land, 15 and Headley was not a builder. Thus the court's
imposition of liability upon each does not appear to have depended
upon a requirement that the builder-vendor be both a builder and
seller.' 6 Thornton was apparently liable because he was the builder,
and Headley was liable because he was a seller who hired a builder.' 7
Similarly, in Gay v. Cornwall,'8 the builder was liable for breach of
warranty though he never owned or sold the land. The sellers were
dismissed, arguably, because they had not hired the builder. 19
448, 557 P.2d at 26. Thus, one could argue that the court intended to hold only builders
who were also sellers liable. In view of the opposite result reached in House v. Thorn-
ton, 76 Wn. 2d 428, 457 P.2d 199 (1969), and Gay v. Cornwall, 6 Wn. App. 595, 494
P.2d 1371 (1972), it is more consistent to view the Allen wording as pertaining only to
the facts of that case where the builder was also the seller. If the court had been attempt-
ing to state the general rule, it probably would have used the term heretofore used in
Washington, "builder-vendor." It should be noted that a seller found liable for his
builder's defective work may sue the builder on the implied warranty contained within
the construction contract between them. See note 2 supra. The seller may also file
against the contractor's bond. See note 10 supra.
13. 76Wn. 2d428,457 P.2d 199(1969).
14. 6Wn. App. 595, 494 P.2d 1371 (1972).
15. 76 Wn. 2d at 429, 457 P.2d at 199 (Headley owned the lot and entered into a
copartnership with Thornton).
16. Accord, Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 115
Cal. Rptr. 648 (1974) (developers (sellers) who merely hired builders, but who were not
themselves builders, were liable for breach of the warranty of fitness in new buildings).
Contra, 45 WASH. L. REV. 670, 671 (1970) (the author maintains that the vendor must
also be the builder).
17. House v. Thornton, 76 Wn. 2d 428, 457 P.2d 199 (1969) (by implication). Ac-
cord, Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972) (the court imposed lia-
bility upon a seller who was not a builder, but who hired one). In support of its decision
the Smith court cited House as a case abandoning the "strict rule of caveat emptor...
under the circumstances present in the instant case." Id. at 801 (emphasis added). It
could be argued that hiring a builder is not enough, that instead one must be copartners
with one, since the House court mentioned that Headley and Thornton were copartners.
76 Wn. 2d at 429, 457 P.2d at 200. However, the court included that information in a
general recital of the facts and did not mention it again. This lack of emphasis encour-
ages the belief that a copartnership was not intended as a prerequisite to imposition of
liability upon the builder and seller. Accord, Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal.
3d 374, 377, 525 P.2d 88, 89, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648,* 649 (1974) (by implication) (the fact
that the defendant sellers had a written construction agreement with the builder was
enough to render them liable for breach of the warranty of fitness: the court did not
stipulate that the agreement created a copartnership).
18. 6 Wn. App. 595, 494 P.2d 1371 (1972).
19. Id. at 597, 494 P.2d at 1373. The sellers were not in privity with the builder;
they lacked a firm construction contract with him and thus were not deemed to have
"hired" him. See note 31 infra. Because the sellers had no knowledge of the house's de-
fects, they could not be liable for failure to disclose them.
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III. SELLER'S v. BUILDER'S WARRANTY
Because either party can be liable for breach of the new house war-
ranty, an additional question is whether the Washington warranty is a
builder's or a seller's warranty. That is, is the seller who hires a
builder liable because he sells the house, or because he, in some man-
ner, participates in the construction of it?
Washington construction contracts have long had an implied
builder's warranty whereby the builder who furnishes building plans
impliedly promises that the structure will be fit for its intended use
and will be constructed in a workmanlike manner.20
In most jurisdictions imposing such a warranty, the builder is ac-
countable for the following reasons: (1) he is responsible for the de-
fect or is at least in a position to detect and repair it;21 (2) he holds
himself out as having the skill to construct the house;2 2 (3) this skill is
relied upon by the buyer, who usually does not possess such expertise
himself;23 and (4) the builder is usually in a better position than the
buyer to spread the cost of repairs.2 4
The rationale of a builder's warranty also supports imposition of li-
ability upon sellers who hire builders. Although the seller does not
personally create the defect, he is in a position to hire a reputable
builder, inspect the work, and demand repair.2 5 This position encour-
20. See Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 52 Wn. 2d 830, 833, 329 P.2d 474, 476
(1958). See note 3 supra.
21. Conyers v. Molloy, 7 I11. App. 3d 695, 364 N.E.2d 986, 988 (1977); Schipper v.
Levitt & Sons, 44 NJ. 70, 207 A.2d 314,326 (1965).
22. Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803, 807 (1967).
23. Conyers v. Molloy, 7 I11. App. 3d 695, 364 N.E.2d 986, 988 (1977); Schipper v.
Levitt & Sons, 44 NJ. 70, 207 A.2d 314, 326 (1965): Yepsen v. Burgess, 269 Or. 635.
525 P.2d 1019, 1022 (1974).
24. Conyers v. Molloy, 7 I11. App. 3d 695, 364 N.E.2d 986, 988 (1977); Schipper v.
Levitt & Sons, 44 NJ. 70, 207 A.2d 314, 326 (1965).
25. See Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 380, 525 P.2d 88, 91.
115 Cal. Rptr. 648, 651 (1974); Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795, 801
(Mo. 1972). One commentator argues that liability should not be solely restricted to
sellers in a position to inspect and demand repair:
Today the implied warranty of merchantability has nothing to do with the special
knowledge or responsibility of the seller of goods. When the local grocer sells a loaf
of packaged bread, he may be described as a merchant with respect to that bread,
but he has no more control over the contents or quality of that bread and no more
knowledge about how bread should be made or packaged than the plumber's wife
who buys it .... The argument that the grocer ... selects his supplier is also spe-
cious in this day of mass advertising and trade-name selling; in fact, the retailer
may not have any idea who the producer of the particular article is .... So any
notion that liability without demonstrated fault should only be imposed upon those
who are knowedgeable about the commodity ... does not have any significance in
our sales law today, although it seems that such was the origin of the "merchant" re-
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ages justified reliance by the buyer upon him.2 6 Furthermore, he is
usually able to bear the cost of repair more easily than the buyer.27
The rationales for imposing liability on builders, and upon sellers
who hire them, support the conclusion that in Washington, at least, it
is the builder's construction contract warranty which has been ex-
tended to vendors in sales contracts.28 Basically, the seller who hires a
builder vicariously assumes and offers builder's warranty because
of the contractual relation with him.29 Thus in Gay v. Cornwall,30
the sellers were dismissed apparently because they lacked a firm
construction contract with the builder,31 whereas in House v.
quirement which still exists.
Haskell, The Case For An Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53
GEo. LJ. 633, 649 (1965) (footnote omitted).
This argument may be countered with the point that today's grocer may not know
much about his supplier because he does not care to know. He is not worried about the
warranty costs of defective bread; bread is neither a high risk nor an expensive item.
Presumably, were he responsible for a $100,000 item such as a house, he would take
more care in his selection of suppliers and would carefully inspect the item, or make
sure his contract with the supplier had an indemnification clause. It seems unjust to im-
pose liability upon him unless he has such control.
26. Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 380, 525 P.2d 88, 91, 115
Cal. Rptr. 648, 651 (1974).
27. The seller obtains an implied warranty of fitness in the construction contract
with the builder. Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 52 Wn. 2d 830, 833, 329 P.2d 474, 476
(1958). Thus if the seller is sued, he has recourse against the builder, who in turn can
spread his costs over the other houses he erects or, in some cases, seek indemnification
from the supplier of the building plans. See note 3 supra. The seller also has recourse
against the contractor's bond. See note 10 supra.
28. The elements of the construction contract warranty-fitness for use (habitabil-
ity) and proper workmanship, see note 3 supra--are both present in the sales contract
warranty explained in Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wn. 2d 567, 554 P.2d 1349 (1976). See Part
IV-E-2 infra. Additionally, in House v. Thornton, 76 Wn. 2d at 434, 457 P.2d at 233,
the court stated that the warranties in construction and sales contracts were "closely re-
lated." Accord, e.g., Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399, 402 (1964).
29. California courts maintain that the seller makes an implied representation for
the builder. In Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 380, 525 P.2d 88, 91,
115 Cal. Rptr. 648, 651 (1974), the court, in imposing an implied warranty of merchan-
tability, stated, "In the setting of the marketplace, the builder or seller of new con-
struction-not unlike the manufacturer or merchandiser of personalty-makes implied
representations, ordinarily indispensible to the sale, that the builder has used reasonable
skill and judgment in constructing the building." Id. at 380, 525 P.2d at 91, 115 Cal.
Rptr. at 651 (emphasis added).
By analogy, the Uniform Commercial Code would speak of the builder's knowledge
and skill being "attributed" to the seller. It defines "merchant" as follows: "[A] person
who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having
knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to
whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent....
WASH. REv. CODE § 62A.2-104(1) (1976) (emphasis added).
30. 6Wn.App. 595, 494 P.2d 1371 (1972).
31. Id. In Gay, Childs, the lot owner, hired a builder to erect a house. Childs then
sold to the Cornwalls who sold to Mrs. Gay, who sued both the Cornwalls and the
builder. The trial court dismissed the Cornwalls because they had no knowledge of the
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Thornton,32 when a firm construction contract existed, 33 the seller
who hired the builder was accountable along with the builder.
These cases demonstrate that a pure seller's warranty is not in-
tended in Washington. The seller is liable, not because he sells the
product, but because he is, or has a construction contract 34 with, a
defects. Id. at 596-97, 494 P.2d at 1373. See, e.g., Sorrell v. Young, 6 Wn. App. 220,
491 P.2d 1312 (1971) (seller of used house has a duty to disclose defects when the seller
has knowledge of them, the purchaser is justifiably ignorant of them, and they materially
affect the value of the property).
In view of the court's statement that the new house implied warranty theory is one of
strict liability, 6 Wn. App. at 597, 494 P.2d at 1373, this dismissal (for lack of knowl-
edge on a cause of action in which knowledge is irrelevant) is nonsensical unless predi-
cated on the assumption that the seller's liability for breach of warranty depends on a
firm construction contract between the seller and builder. Childs, the original owner of
the lot, and the builder had such a contract, but the Cornwalls and the builder did not.
Their connection to the builder was "unclear." id.
The only other explanation for the dismissal is to hypothesize that sellers are never li-
able for builder mistakes. The result in House v. Thornton, 76 Wn. 2d 428, 457 P.2d
199 (1969), refutes such a contention. See text accompanying notes 13-17 supra. It
should not be argued that the Cornwalls were dismissed because their sale to Mrs. Gay
was, perhaps, noncommercial. The commercial sale requirement was articulated after
the Gay decision in Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wn. 2d 567, 554 P.2d 1349 (1976). See Part IV-
D infra.
32. 76Wn. 2d 428,457 P.2d 199(1969).
33. In House, Headley, the owner and seller of the land, was liable along with the
builder. Their "construction contract" consisted of a copartnership. Id. at 429, 457 P.2d
at 200. The court imposed liability because:
As between vendor and purchaser, the builder-vendors, even though exercising rea-
sonable care to construct a sound building, had by far the better opportunity to ex-
amine the stability of the site and to determine the kind of foundation to install....
[T] heir position throughout the process of selection, planning and construction
was markedly superior to that of their first purchaser-occupant. To borrow an idea
from equity, of the innocent parties who suffered, it was the builder-vendor who
made the harm possible. If there is a comparative standard of innocence, as well as
culpability, the defendants who built and sold the house were less innocent and
more culpable than the wholly innocent and unsuspecting buyer.
Id. at 435-36, 457 P.2d at 204.
34. The necessity of a construction contract precludes extension of the warranty to
the average sale of used housing. Contra, Haskell, supra note 25, at 633. Generally the
seller of a used house should not be responsible for defects for the following reasons: (1)
he neither builds nor hires the builder of the house and thus is not in a position to over-
see or demand repair; (2) he is unable to spread costs since he usually sells only one
house; (3) he cannot bear the cost more easily than the buyer because any contractual re-
lationship to the builder which would allow an indemnification suit would normally be
barred by a statute of limitations; and (4) the seller makes a personal, noncommercial
sale and thus does not hold himself out as a businessman who should bear the risks along
with the benefits. In addition, the typical seller of a used house is a nonexpert so there
can be no reasonable buyer reliance upon him. There can, however, be reasonable reli-
ance upon his nonexpert, actual knowledge of defects, and a mandatory disclosure re-
quirement of such knowledge is reasonable.
Such a requirement was considered by the House Financial Institutions Committee
of the Washington legislature. Proposed Act Relating to Real Estate Transfers: Hear-
ings on H-2490178 Before the House Financial Institutions Committee, 45th Legisla-
ture (1978) (draft of proposed act on file with Washington Law Review). Home resale
disclosure requirements would require sellers to make written disclosure of,
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builder.35 The simple act of selling a house is not enough. 36
IV. ELEMENTS OF WASHINGTON'S IMPLIED
WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
The most complete discussion of Washington's new house implied
warranty of habitability 37 appears in Klos v. Gockel.38 There the
court explained the warranty's elements:3 9 (1) the structure must be a
among other items, "all substantial defects or malfunctions in the major systems or ma-
jor appliances ... known to the transferor." Id., Draft of Proposed Act at § 9(5) (empha-
sis added). This disclosure would generally be made when the house was listed, thus al-
lowing buyers to make an informed decision before purchasing.
It has been suggested that the bill is not needed because warranty insurance for used
homes will soon be widely available. Such insurance is currently being considered by
Better Homes & Gardens Real Estate Service, Locust at 17th, Des Moines, Iowa,
50336. Insurance, however, is not a substitute for disclosure unless sellers are required
to purchase it. That would be an unfortunate requirement. The cost would be passed on
to the buyer in the price of the house, thus forcing purchase of insurance upon buyers
who, if they knew of the obvious defects through seller disclosure, might prefer to forego
insurance. Actually, Washington courts are already moving in the direction of this bill,
and thus an implied warranty is not needed in sales of used housing. If the constructive
fraud cases, e.g., Gunnar v. Brice, 17 Wn. App. 819, 565 P.2d 1212 (1977); Sorrell v.
Young, 6 Wn. App. 220, 491 P.2d 1312 (197 1), are carried to their logical conclusion,
sellers of used houses will be guilty of constructive fraud if they do not disclose material
defects of which they have knowledge and of which the purchaser is justifiably ignorant.
This is adequate and fair protection for buyers, and no more should be expected of the
layman seller. When a seller knows nothing or little about housing construction, the ex-
tent of his liability for defects should encompass only those material defects of which he
has knowledge.
35. The significance of this point can be seen in the following example. A builder
erects a house but is unable to sell it. An investor, who has no previous connection with
the builder and plans immediately to resell for profit, buys and sells the house. His
buyer discovers a defect and sues for breach of implied warranty. Under most formula-
tions, the investor has made a commercial sale of a new house. If the warranty were a
seller's warranty, he would be liable from the act of selling. Because it appears to be a
vicarious builder's warranty, however, he should not be liable because he lacks the nec-
essary construction contract with the builder. The investor had no chance to choose a re-
putable builder, oversee work or demand repair. In fact, he knew nothing of the actual
quality of the house with the exception of those defects which could be determined upon
inspection. See note 51 infra. Buyer reliance upon him is unjustified unless he holds
himself out as a person experienced in buying and selling sound houses.
36. See note 31 supra.
37. The terms "implied warranty of habitability," "implied warranty of fitness,"
and "implied warranty of suitability" are used synonymously by the courts. Klos v.
Gockel, 87 Wn. 2d 567, 568, 570, 554 P.2d 1349; 1351-52 (1976).
38. Id. In Klos, the defendant was a seller-contractor who formerly assisted her
builder-husband. Their practice had been to live in one house while building others and
then to sell all of the houses. After her husband died, the defendant built three more
houses. She testified that she built the first house, the residence in question, for her per-
sonal use, lived in it one year, and then decided to sell it to the plaintiffs. After the sale,
a mudslide and settling of fill damaged the backyard area; the house itself sustained only
minor damage.
39. Id. at 570, 554 P.2d at 1352. The Klos court established the warranty elements
by explaining the decision in Hbuse v. Thornton, 76 Wn. 2d 428, 457 P.2d 199 (1969).
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house; (2) the house must be new; (3) the warranty runs to the first
purchaser and/or occupant; (4) the sale must be commercial; (5) the
warranty is one of habitability covering structural defects of the
dwelling and fixtures; (6) the warranty begins to run at the time the
deed is passed or the buyer takes possession, whichever occurs first;
and (7) there is no merger by deed. 40 Because the simplicity of the
first five elements is deceptive, they will be discussed in the following
sections.
A. The Structure Must Be a House
In most of the Washington decisions discussing the implied war-
ranty of habitability in sales of real property, the warranty is limited
to sales of new houses. 41 Most jurisdictions similarly limit their war-
ranty.42 The rationale for this limitation is the belief that the average
home buyer is ignorant of construction quality, whereas the buyer of
That court held that, "when a vendor-builder sells a new house to its first intended occu-
pant, he impliedly warrants that the foundations supporting it are firm and secure and
that the house is structurally safe for the buyer's intended purpose of living in it." Id. at
436, 457 P.2d at 204. Klos amplified the House holding by quoting Hartley v. Ballou.
286 N.C. 51, 209 S.E.2d 776 (1974):
[W] e hold that in every contract for the sale of a recently completed dwelling, and
in every contract for the sale of a dwelling then under construction, the vendor. if
he be in the business of building such dwellings, shall be held to impliedly warrant
to the initial vendee that, at the time of the passing of the deed or the taking of pos-
session by the initial vendee (whichever first occurs), the dwellng, together with all
its fixtures, is sufficiently free from major structural defects, and is constructed in
a workmanlike manner, so as to meet the standard of workmanlike quality then
prevailing at the time and place of construction; and that this implied warranty in
the contract of sale survives the passing of the deed or the taking of possession by
the initial vendee.
Id. at 62, 209 S.E.2d at 783 (emphasis added).
The warranty elements set out in the text stem from a combination of the House and
Hartley definitions. Because of this, it should be noted that though the Klos court stated
that Hartley contained a more detailed statement of the House warranty, the statement
was made within a paragraph designed to explain the commercial sale rule. Thus one
could argue that Hartley was used solely to explain that concept. The better view, and
the one upon which this comment is based, appears to be that Hartley was used for that
purpose, and for the purpose of fully explaining House. This is true both because the
court stated that the Hartley quotation detailed House, and because the quotation goes
far beyond that necessary to explain the commercial sale.
40. For a discussion of the merger doctrine, see Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 383, 432
(1969) (general rule that a contract is merged into a deed does not apply: the sales con-
tract implied warranty is not extinguished by buyer acceptance of the deed).
41. Klosv. Gockel, 87 Wn. 2d at 568, 554 P.2d at 1351; House v. Thornton, 76Wn.
2d at 436, 457 P.2d at 204; Gay v. Cornwall, 6 Wn. App. at 597, 494 P.2d at 1372.
42. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964). Indeed, the
author has found only two states which specifically extend warranty coverage beyond
houses. See note 44 infra.
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commercial property is knowledgeable enough to ask for an inspec-
tion and wealthy enough to afford one.43
Two states specifically extend the warranty beyond houses, 44 and a
recent court of appeals decision indicates that Washington may do
likewise. In Allen v. Anderson,45 despite previous Washington hold-
ings, the court stated that the warranty applies to new buildings46 and
considered it in regard to a four-unit apartment complex.47
Whether the Allen application correctly states the Washington law
is unclear. It can be argued that the pre-Allen holdings did not restrict
the warranty to houses, but rather used the term "house" because only
houses were, in fact, at issue.48 It can also be argued that the warranty
was indeed restricted to houses and Allen's extension was unjustified.
Allen's extension of the warranty beyond houses appears to be ap-
propriate, however. Whether the structure is a house or an office
building, the builder-vendor holds himself out as competent to erect
it,49 and the assumption that commercial buyers can always obtain
43. Professor Bearman, the formulator of a model statutory warranty, states:
Since the imposition of the unqualified implied warranty of quality is based
upon the theory that it is the ordinary home buyer, relatively ignorant of the busi-
ness of buying a home, who needs this statutory protection, the unqualified war-
ranty is implied ... only in purchases of one- or two-family homes. Anything larger
than a two-family dwelling is often an apartment house, and these are commonly
purchased by corporations or individuals with enough wealth to afford competent
inspection or knowledge of the realty business to lower the important reliance fac-
tor considerably.
Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND.
L. REV. 541, 575 (1961).
44. Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 380, 525 P.2d 88, 91, 115
Cal. Rptr. 648, 651 (1974) (warranty covers "new construction" and was applied to an
apartment building); Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11, 18, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (im-
plied warranty covers new homes and condominiums).
45. 16Wn. App. 446, 557 P.2d 24(1976).
46. The jury instructions began: "When the builder of a new building sells it to a
purchaser, he impliedly warrants .... Id. at 448, 557 P.2d at 26 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 446, 557 P.2d at 25. The court assumed that the apartment qualified for
warranty coverage. Instead of dismissing the suit outright, it remanded for findings of
fact on other elements of the warrafity.
48. It could also be argued that the Allen court simply followed the holding in Fain
v. Nelson, 57 Wn. 2d 217, 356 P.2d 302 (1960); in Fain the court applied a construction
contract implied warranty to a bar and dance hall. The warranty was the same as that
recognized in Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 52 Wn. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958), in
which it was applied to a house. No distinction between a house and a commercial
building was made. These cases are distinguishable from House and its progeny because
they involved construction, rather than sales contracts. However, it appears to be the
construction contract warranty which was extended to sales contracts in House. See
note 28 supra.
49. Most of the elements justifying the implied warranty in housing sales, see notes
21-27 and accompanying text supra, are present in commercial sales of business prop-
erty. The builder-vendor is responsible for the defect, is in a position to oversee, repair,
or more easily bear the costs, and has a speculative intent.
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and afford adequate building inspections 50 is not necessarily valid. 51
Also, the warranty of habitability includes a standard of local work-
manlike quality,5 2 thus regardless of the type of building or extent of
buyer reliance, the builder should be accountable when he falls below
that standard. 53
The meaning of "house" is another aspect of the warranty which is
unclear. Does it include only the main building, or is a driveway, for
example, also included? In Klos v. Gockel,54 a mudslide ruined the
patio but did little damage to the house itself.55 The court said:
[T] he buckling and sinking of the front yard patio slabs [did not] af-
fect the habitability of the house, and [is not] a structural [defect] af-
fecting habitability. . . . The law of implied warranty is not broad
enough to make the builder-vendor of a house absolutely liable for all
mishaps occurring within the boundaries of the improved real prop-
erty.56
This statement encourages the belief that defective driveways and
outbuildings, though purchased as part of the housing package, are
not covered. Like the patio, they do not affect the habitability of the
house;57 protection appears to be extended only to the dwelling itself.
50. See note 43 supra, quoting Professor Bearman, who states that the buyer of any-
thing larger than a one- or two-family home is generally wealthy enough to afford com-
petent inspection.
51. Adequate inspection of a foundation, for example, is very difficult because the
foundation is hidden once the house is completed. For cases noting the difficulty of
making an adequate inspection, see Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374.
380, 525 P.2d 88, 91, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648, 651 (1974); Conyers v. Molloy, 364 N.E.2d
986, 988 (1977); Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W. 2d 795, 799 (Mo. 1972); Rut-
ledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 175 S.W. 2d 792, 795 (1970). With the advent of con-
dominium office buildings, the assumption that a commercial buyer is wealthy is also
questionable. A struggling businessman, fearing an increase in rent, might choose to
buy a moderately priced condominium office.
52. See Part IV-E.-2 infra.
53. In the usual commercial building sale, Washington builder accountability is not
a problem because the buyer commonly has a construction contract with the builder and
is thus protected by the construction contract's implied warranty. See note 2 supra. That
warranty is confined to construction contracts, however, and commercial buildings are
increasingly being built on a speculation basis in which the builder erects the building
on his own and then sells it through a sales contract. The buyer under the sales contract
would be unprotected as he would have no construction contract implied warranty and
the Washington sales contract implied warranty applies only to residences and perhaps
apartments. See notes 44-48 and accompanying text supra.
54. 87 Wn. 2d 567, 554 P.2d 1349 (1976).
55. The court stated that "a portion of the slope below the rear wall of the house slid.
The ground beneath the front patio settled causing cracks and an upending of the patio
slabs." Id. at 569, 554 P.2d at 1351.
56. Id. at 571-72, 554 P.2d at 1353.




This policy is not followed in other areas of law,58 and it conflicts
with Gay v. Cornwall.59 Clarification is needed.
B. The House Must Be New
For implied warranty coverage the dwelling must be "new," 60 but a
house which has been lived in can be considered new if it was occu-
pied to promote its sale. In other words, "the sale must be fairly con-
temporaneous with completion and not interrupted by an intervening
tenancy unless the builder-vendor created such an intervening tenancy
for the primary purpose of promoting the sale of the property."16
The requirement that the sale be "fairly contemporaneous" unnec-
essarily distorts the purpose of the implied warranty by focusing on
the time of sale rather than the lifespan of the defect. For example, if
a foundation could reasonably be expected to last fifty years, any
tional, ten-year insurance-warranty plan. Excluded from coverage are driveways, walk-
ways, landscaping, fences, swimming pools, and outbuildings. As for patios, only those
"not an integral part of the home" are excluded. Home Owners Warranty Corp., HOW
Application Booklet 9 (June 1977) (available from HOW, National Housing Center,
15th and M. Streets N.W., Washington, D.C., 20005).
58. See WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-314(2) (1976). The merchant selling a chair with
an ottoman warrants that both are merchantable. Providing an adequate chair, thq main
item purchased, does not shield the merchant from liability for a defective ottoman. The
contrary rationale behind protecting only the house in real property sales probably
stems from the courts' focus on housing policy. If the buyer can be protected when the
roof of the house falls in, it is of little concern that the barn's roof has also collapsed, as
the buyer does not live there. This focus ignores judicial economic policy, however,
which has long been concerned with insuring that the contractee receives the benefit of
his bargain. The buyer who purchases a house and barn, paying more for both than for
either, does not receive the benefit of his bargain when the law provides a remedy for
housing defects only.
59. 6 Wn. App. 595, 494 P.2d 1371 (1972). In Gay a defective driveway drainfield
and gutters which drained into the yard were listed with defects causing breach of the
warranty. Id. at 596, 494 P.2d at 1373. The court did not specify that the defects affected
the livability of the house itself. Rather they seemed to be listed simply as examples of
defective work. Though the effect of the defects in Gay on the house itself seems to be
analogous to that of the patio in Klos, the Klos court did not distinguish Gay before ex-
plaining that the builder-vendor should not be liable for "all mishaps occurring within
the boundaries of the improved real property." Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wn. 2d at 569, 554
P.2d at 1353.
60. Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wn. 2d at 568, 554 P.2d at 1351; House v. Thornton, 76 Wn.
2d at 436, 457 P.2d at 204; Allen v. Anderson, 16 Wn. App. at 448, 557 P.2d at 26; Gay
v. Cornwall, 6 Wn. App. at 595, 494 P.2d at 1371 (1972). The question of "newness" is
one of fact, and, though the passage of time can eliminate liability, the amount of time
required for such cancellation will vary with each case. Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wn. 2d at
571, 554 P.2d at 1352.
61. Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wn. 2d at 571, 554 P.2d at 1352. The court maintained that
this requirement was stated in House, 87 Wn. 2d at 570, 554 P.2d at 1352. However,
House is silent on this point.
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defect appearing within the first ten years could be deemed a defect in
a "new" foundation. This would be true both for a buyer who pur-
chased the house contemporaneously with completion, and for one
who purchased five years later. 62 This approach has been taken in two
jurisdictions. 63 In Washington, however, a six-year statute of limita-
tions governs construction litigation. 64
The second requirement in determining "newness" is that the sale
must not be interrupted by an intervening tenancy, unless such ten-
ancy is for the purpose of promoting sale.65 By implication, interven-
ing tenancies which do not promote sale will insulate the builder-
vendor from the implied warranty. Thus, builders could live tempo-
rarily in a house to negate the warranty since such a tenancy would
hurt rather than facilitate sale. This practice, as explained by the trial
judge in Klos, frustrates the purpose of the warranty by giving the
warranty's protection to the first occupant, rather than the first pur-
chaser and/or occupant. 66
62. For a discussion of the transferability of the warranty, see notes 77-82 and ac-
companying text infra.
63. In Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 342 N.E.2d 619 (Ind. 1976), the warranty was
extended to a second purchaser though he bought four years after completion. The de-
fects, a leaky basement and a large crack in three of the basement walls, did not appear
until after the second purchase. The court extended coverage without regard to the new
or used character of the house.
In Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975), the court decided that a year-
old septic tank qualified for warranty coverage, finding that, "different parts of con-
struction may have a different expected life, such as a foundation compared to a roof.
We have no problem in the present case because the septic tank system failed before a
minimum life expectancy had been reached .. .." Id. at 1282.
64. See notes 140-45 and accompanying text infra.
65. As an example, the Kios court cited Casavant v. Campopiano, 114 R.I. 24, 327
A.2d 831 (1974), a case in which the defendant builder-vendor rented a house to a
couple who intended to purchase the house. About one year later the couple vacated and
the defendant sold to the plaintiff. The roof subsequently sagged, making occupation
unsafe. The court stated that the thrust of the implied warranty was,
to afford protection to home buyers from the overreaching of knowledgeable
builder-vendors. That there had been an intervening tenancy should not, standing
alone, deprive the buyer of that protection .... This argument [that the house was
used] might have merit if the intervening occupancy appeared to be causally con-
nected with the defective condition of the roof or was of such extended duration as
to make an application of the warranties unreasonable. In the absence of such find-
ings, the court will assume that the builder-vendor was responsible for the existence
of the defect and that the structure was a "new" house ....
327 A.2d at 833.
66. Brief for Respondent at 11, Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wn. 2d 567, 554 P.2d 1349
(1976) (quoting the trial judge):
If one were to say that a contractor can build a residence, then move into it for
any period of time, thereafter move out and sell it, or just build it, move into it and
sell it while living there, the whole purpose of the law would be destroyed by that
concept. The concept is to protect a person who purchases the home from the
builder-contractor.... Here, Mrs. Gockel constructed it, moved into it in a some-
198
New Home Warranty
To discourage such tenancies the court should imply a warranty in
every sale by a builder because the builder is an expert and responsi-
ble for the condition of the house. A rule of reasonableness, governed
by the length of the tenancy and nature of the defect, should deter-
mine the scope of the warranty.67
C. The Warranty Runs, Without Privity, to the First Purchaser
andlor Occupant
In House v. Thornton,68 the court stated that the implied warranty
of habitability ran to the "first intended occupant. '' 69 It appears,
however, that the court meant "first purchaser-occupant,"70 the term
used in Gay v. Cornwall.71 The court in Klos v. Gockel72 did not ob-
ject to the Gay formulation, yet it used the term "initial-vendee," a de-
signation which would have prevented warranty extension to the
plaintiff in Gay.73 This tolerance indicates that either formulation is
acceptable in Washington.7 4 The warranty apparently runs to who-
what unfinished state although apparently suitable for her purposes while she re-
sided in it, but did make substantial alterations and additions to it in placing it on
the market.
It seems illogical to say that Mrs. Gockel would be the contractor and also the
purchaser. She would be selling a house to herself, and in doing so deprive some
other person the protection and that I feel confident is not within the spirit of the
law.
Id.
67. A builder who occupies the house for three years before sale could not reason-
ably be held to the same warranty imposed upon a builder whose occupancy lasted six
months.
68. 76 Wn. 2d 428, 457 P.2d 199 (1969).
69. Id. at 436, 457 P.2d at 204.
70. The House court originally spoke of the "first buyer and occupant," id. at 429,
457 P.2d at 200, but used the misleading term "first intended occupant" in the holding.
Id. at 436, 457 P.2d at 204.
71. 6 Wn. App. at 595, 494 P.2d at 1371(1972).
Childs, the owner of the lot, contracted with the defendant builder to erect a house
upon it. Before completion, Childs sold to the Cornwalls, who sold to Mrs. Gay, the
plaintiff. She was the first occupant of the defective house.
The court allowed Mrs. Gay to utilize the implied warranty because she was the first
purchaser-occupant, even though Childs was the first intended occupant.
72. 87 Wn. 2d'567, 554 P.2d 1349 (1976).
73. Id. at 570, 554 P.2d at 1352. Mrs. Gay was the second, rather than the initial
vendee.
74. This result is necessary, for either term alone unnecessarily excludes some pur-
chasers from use of the warranty. Under the "first purchaser-occupant" concept a buyer
who decided to sell before occupying the house would not be covered. Defects discov-
ered while the house was for sale might prevent sale yet recourse would be unavailable
until occupation occurred. Similarly, under the "initial-vendee" concept, the Gay situa-
tion arises. Buyer A sells to Buyer B who first occupies the house and discovers defects.
Because Buyer B is the second vendee, warranty coverage would not be available.
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ever is appropriate under the circumstances, the initial vendee or the
first purchaser-occupant, the "first purchaser and/or occupant."
The court in Gay also established that privity of contract is not
needed between the builder-vendor and the first purchaser and/or oc-
cupant.75 The tort concept of strict liability, which does not require
privity between plaintiff and defendant, has been incorporated into
the new house implied warranty.76
One unanswered question is whether successive purchaser-occu-
pants may use the warranty.77 Some courts have found the warranty
to be nontransferable.78 However, one court hinted that it would al-
75. 6 Wn. App. at 595, 494 P.2d at 1373 (Mrs. Gay had no contractual relationship
with the defendant builder against whom she recovered). Accord, Barnes v. Mac Brown
& Co., 342 N.E.2d 619 (Ind. 1976); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons. Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207
A.2d 314, 328 (1965) (lessees of original vendee were allowed to recover against the
builder, despite lack of privity with him). See also, Jaeger, An Emerging Concept: Con-
suaner Protection in Statutory Regulation, Products Liability and Sale of New Homes,
II VAL. U.L. REV. 335, 343-44 (1977).
76. 6 Wn. App. at 597, 494 P.2d at 1373. The court in Gay used the term "strict lia-
bility." Though Washington's implied warranty originated in contract law. Hoye v.
Century Builders. Inc.. 52 Wn. 2d 830, 833, 329 P.2d 474, 476 (1958), the tort concept of
strict liability has since been adopted. See Berg v. Stromme, 79 Wn. 2d 184. 195. 484
P.2d 380, 386 (197 1). As used by the courts, this means that the implied warranty does
not depend upon knowledge or fault of the builder-vendor. Accord, Smith v. Old War-
son Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972); Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407. 175
S.E.2d 792 (1970); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57. 154 N.W.2d 803
(1967).
In Berg, a car warranty case which discussed house warranties, the court stated that
the rule of strict liability had been adopted in contract law. 79 Wn. 2d at 195, 484 P.2d
at 386. Thus, it appears that the warranty still stems primarily from contract law, and a
contract, rather than tort, statute of limitation is applicable. For the appropriate statute
of limitation, see notes 140-43 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of the im-
pact of the strict liability rule on other Washington law dealing with builders, see note 3
stpra.
77. Whether the implied warranty extends to persons related to the first purchaser
and/or occupant is unclear. If the Uniform Commercial Code, WASH. REV. CODE §
62A.2-3 18 (1976), is used by analogy, the implied warranty, in regard to personal inju-
ries, should extend to family, household members, and guests of the buyer, as such a
group could reasonably be expected to use the house. Though the status of guests is un-
certain, dictum indicates Washington will extend protection to family members. Berg v.
Stromme, 79 Wn. 2d 184, 195, 484 P.2d 380, 386 (1971) (the court stated that the war-
ranty extends to the buyer and his family). Accord, Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44
N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965) (the son of the buyer's lessee was injured by a defective hot
water system).
78. Oliver v. City Builders, Inc., 303 So. 2d 466 (Miss. 1974) (the implied warranty
extends only to the person buying from the builder-subsequent purchasers are ex-
cluded). See also Wright v. Creative Corp., 30 Colo. App. 575, 498 P.2d 1179 (1972).
The Wright court based its decision to deny transfer of the warranty on H. B. Bolas En-
terprises, Inc. v. Zarlengo, 156 Colo. 530, 400 P.2d 447 (1965), however, a case in which
the court denied transfer because the house was used, not necessarily because the court
disapproved transferring the warranty.
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low transfer of the warranty,79 and another has actually done so.80
Because the purpose of the warranty is to protect innocent purchasers
while holding builder-vendors accountable for their work, protecting
all purchasers who buy during the warranty period seems prefer-
able.81
Interestingly, this approach has been voluntarily adopted by build-
ers themselves. In the national written warranty-insurance plan pub-
lished by the Home Owners Warranty Corporation (HOW), purchas-
ers of homes built by HOW builders receive a ten-year warranty-
insurance package which is automatically transferred to subsequent
purchasers within the ten-year period.8 2
79. In Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d II (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972), the court declared:
The instant case deals with the first purchasers of condominium homes. We ponder,
but do not decide, what result would occur if more remote purchasers were in-
volved. We recognize that liability must have an end but question the creation of
any artificial limits of either time or remoteness to the original purchaser.
Id. at 18.
80. In Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 342 N.E.2d 619 (Ind. 1976), the first purchaser-
occupants sold the defective house to the second purchaser-occupants four years after
the initial purchase. The court, declaring privity requirements to be "outmoded," ex-
tended the warranty to the second purchaser-occupants but limited its coverage to "la-
tent defects, not discoverable by a subsequent purchaser's reasonable inspection, mani-
festing themselves after the purchase." Id. at 620-21. It also imposed a standard of
reasonableness to determine whether breach of the warranty had occurred. Id.
This approach is similar to that taken in the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, where
"consumer" means a "buyer (other than for purposes of resale) of any consumer pro-
duct, [and] any person to whom such product is transferred during the duration of an
implied or written warranty . . . applicable to the product." MAGNUSON-Moss WAR-
WANTY AcT, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3) (1976). The Act is not applicable here as it covers
only consumer goods. Though parts of a house might fall into this category, the house as
a unit will not. Peters, How the Magnason-Moss Warranty Act Affects the Build-
erslSellers of New Housing, 5 REAL EST. L.J. 388 (1977). The concept of transferability
during the warranty period is significant, however, for it indicates the trend toward
acceptability of such tranfers.
8 1. It is arguable that such a rule unduly burdens builder-vendors because the house
suffers extra strain with each new purchaser. However, purchaser-caused defects are not
covered by warranty in other areas of the law, such as sales of consumer goods, where
"an affirmative showing by the seller that the loss resulted from some action or event
following his own delivery of the goods can operate as a defense." WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 62A.2-314, Comment 13 (1966). By analogy, if the walls cracked during the oc-
cupancy of the third purchaser within the warranty period, the builder-vendor would be
liable only if the cracks were attributable to him, rather than to any of the three purchas-
ers. This approach is taken by the Home Owners Warranty Program. Its written war-
ranty-insurance plan excludes "damage caused by materials or workmanship added by
the purchaser, . . . normal wear and tear; [and] defects caused by improper
maintenance or negligence of anyone other than the builder." Home Owners Warranty
Corp., supra note 57, at 9.
82. The HOW limited warranty reads: 'This warranty is extended to you as Pur-
chaser (the first owner to occupy the home as a residence for yourself or your family)
and automatically to any subsequent owners of the home and any mortagage lender who
takes possession of the home .... Home Owners Warranty Corp., supra note 57, at 18.
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A further unresolved area regarding a buyer's ability to use the im-
plied warranty cause of action concerns his knowledge of defects. In
most jurisdictions the warranty does not cover defects of which the
buyer is aware or which should have been visible to a reasonably pru-
dent person. 83 While Washington courts have not specifically rejected
this position, there is language in House v. Thornton which suggests
that they would do so, 84 thus allowing warranty coverage despite pur-
chaser knowledge of defects. Excluding defects known to the buyer is
more consistent with a major purpose of the implied warranty, the
protection of innocent buyers. The buyer who knows or should know
of a defect, yet purchases anyway, is not innocent.
D. The Sale Must Be Commercial
A "commercial rather than casual or personal" sale must be made
before a warranty will be implied. 85 This means that the house must
be built for purposes of sale,86 and the builder 87 must be a mer-
chant.88 According to the Uniform Commercial Code:
83. Professor Haskell summarizes the basic rule: "[I] f the purchaser knows of the
defect, he is not entitled to the protection of the law; this is recognized at common law
and under uniform legislation with respect to sales of goods." Haskell. supra note 25, at
651. Accord, Griffin v. Wheller-Leonard & Co., 290 N.C. 185, 225 S.E.2d 557, 567
(1976); Hartley v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 51,209 S.E.2d 776, 782 (1974).
84. In House v. Thornton, the court stated,
Frequently, the prospective purchaser of a house buys it with knowledge of its de-
fects and makes no point whatever of their existence before consummating the
deal; and if the defects ... do not render the house unfit.., the question of whether
an implied warranty covers them could be said to depend on whether they are of
such magnitude as to prevent the house from being used for the purpose for which it
was purchased.
76 Wn. 2d at 434, 457 P.2d at 203 (emphasis added).
85. Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wn. 2d at 570, 554 P.2d at 1352.
86. The Klos court, id., cited Bolkum v. Staab, 133 Vt. 467, 346 A.2d 210 (1975), to
explain the commercial sale. That case specifically excluded situations in which a house
is built for personal use and later sold. 346 A.2d at 211. In Klos the builder-vendor pre-
vailed, in part because she built the house for personal use. See note 91 infra.
87. The crucial requirement is that the builder be a merchant, whether he sells the
house himself or is hired by a seller. However, the seller who hires a merchant builder
does not have to be a merchant (e.g., a professional developer). In House v. Thornton,
76 Wn. 2d 428, 457 P.2d 199 (1969), the nonbuilder seller was found liable even though
he was a real estate broker rather than a professional developer. The fact that he con-
tracted for the construction of one other house which he subsequently sold should not
have been enough to render him a professional developer. In Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wn. 2d
567, 554 P.2d 1349 (1976), the defendant builder was deemed a nonprofessional builder
though she built and sold three houses. See note 91 infra.
88. Bolkum v. Staab, 133 Vt. 467, 346 A.2d 210 (1975), the case cited by Klos to ex-
plain the commercial sale concept, contains the merchant requirement:
[In the case in which we adopted the implied warranty for new houses] we adopted
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"Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or other-
wise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill
peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to
whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of
an agent .... 89
The essential element of the definition, applied by analogy to housing,
is that the builder must be in the business of building.
A combination of the above requirements results in the following
definition: a commercial sale occurs when there is construction of a
house for purposes of sale, by a builder whose occupation is building,
and there is a subsequent sale by the builder or the seller who hired
him. In Klos v. Gockel9 o the builder's sale was noncommercial be-
cause she built the house for personal use rather than for sale9' and
her occupation was not building.9 2
The foregoing definition of the commercial sale is the general for-
mulation. 93 Washington adds a significant additional requirement: the
builder must be regularly engaged in the business of building.9 4 This
is an unusual limitation. Most courts simply requir,' that the builder-
by analogy the implied warranty of merchantability in the sale of goods where "the
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.". . . This would, arguably,
exclude the casual sale made by a seller not in the business of selling houses, as it
would a sale by one not in the business of selling goods.
346 A.2d at 211 (emphasis added).
89. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-104(1) (1976).
90. 87 Wn.2d 567, 554 P.2d 1349 (1976).
91. The court found that though Mrs. Gockel's conduct was ambiguous, she con-
structed the house "primarily for personal occupancy, but also with the idea that eventu-
ally the house might be sold." KIos v. Gockel, 87 Wn. 2d at 568, 554 P.2d at 1351
(emphasis added). This view is questionable. Mrs. Gockel had been in the business of
building houses, living in and then selling them, for many years with her husband. After
his death, she built one house, lived in it about a year, built the defective house, lived in
it about a year, then built a third, lived in it about a year, and moved to Arizona. Brief
for Respondents at 2-7, Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wn. 2d 567, 554 P.2d 1349 (1976). Although
the court believed Mrs. Gockel's past building experience was relevant to the issue of
whether she could be deemed a professional builder, it did not find the above pattern
persuasive, perhaps because the court apparently confused the facts, thus breaking up
the pattern which might have showed an intent to sell (the court stated that the first house
built was the defective one, and that Mrs. Gockel built only one more house before
moving to Arizona).
92. Id. at 568, 554 P.2d at 1351. Mrs. Gockel's construction of three houses after
her husband's death was seen as continued building on a "restricted scale," rather than
activity sufficient to label her as "regularly engaged" in building. Id.
93. See, e.g., Bolkum v. Staab, 133 Vt. 467, 346 A.2d 210 (1975).
94. "The essence of the implied warranty.., requires that the vendor-builder be a
person regularly engaged in building, so that the sale is commercial rather than casual
or personal in nature." Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wn. 2d at 570, 554 P.2d at 1352 (emphasis
added).
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vendor make a commercial sale,95 not that he regularly make com-
mercial sales. 96 Washington is the only state to impose the "regularly
engaged" limitation,97 though it has done so inconsistently.
98
This position of the Washington courts is unfortunate for two rea-
sons. First, it is inconsistent with the rationale for holding builders, or
the sellers who hire them, liable.99 Secondly, it unfairly affects
95. In Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d at 1282 (Wyo. 1975), the implied warranty
was applied "where a vendor builds new houses for purpose of sale." The "regularly en-
gaged" limitation is absent, as it is in the holdings of other courts. See note 97 infra.
96. Courts impose liability upon builders-vendors even when only one speculation
home is sold. For example, in Bolkum v. Staab, 133 Vt. 467, 346 A.2d 210 (1975), the
defendant owned a large piece of land which he subdivided into building lots according
to a development plan. He hired a builder to erect one house which turned out to be de-
fective. The defendant argued that because he was not a "general" builder the implied
warranty was not applicable. The court ignored the contention and imposed liability be-
cause the sale was commercial and the house was built for speculation. The court did not
base its holding on the fact that the house was part of a development plan-the building
of a single house was enough to impose liability. In Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479
S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972), there was not even a development plan. The builder-vendor
wanted to sell building sites only, and built one model home to encourage sales, al-
though the court noted that the seller subcontracted for one other house. Id. at 799 n.l.
The home was defective and liability was imposed.
97. This limitation has not been imposed in cases from other jurisdictions men-
tioned in this comment and the author is not aware of any other cases which have done
so. Possible exceptions include Griffin v. Wheeler-Leonard & Co., 290 N.C. 185, 225
S.E.2d 557 (1976), in which the court mentioned that the builder described himself as
"in the construction business on a full-time basis." 225 S.E.2d at 559. This description,
however, appeared in the fact section preceding the opinion, and was not referred to
subsequently. Further, the holding did not incorporate the concept that the defendant
was liable only because he was a "full-time" builder-vendor. In Bethlahmy v. Bechtel,
91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966), the court, in discussing why a builder rather than a
buyer should be liable, said, "To apply the rule of caveat emptor to an inexperienced
buyer, and in favor of a builder who is daily engaged in the business of building and sell-
ing houses, is manifestly a denial of justice." 415 P.2d at 710. However, the discussion's
primary emphasis was on buyer reliance, and the concept of being "daily" engaged in
building was not again repeated. It is thus plausible that the court would impose the
warranty when justified reliance was present. even though the builder was not "daily"
engaged in building houses.
98. Washington courts impose the limitation only upon builders, not upon the sell-
ers who hire them. See note 87 supra.
99. See notes 21-27 and accompanying text supra. Basically, the builder-vendor is
responsible for defects because he is in a position to inspect, holds himself out as a busi-
nessman, and produces a product specifically for sale in the market. The only missing
element in the occasional sale is the builder-vendor's ability to spread the cost of liabil-
ity over other sales. However, insurance may be obtained so this limitation is neither
insurmountable nor, perhaps, important when the other factors are present. Insurance
shielding builders for housing defects is not limited to builer liability insurance. Pro-
grams such as the Home Owners Warranty Program are also available. Under the HOW
plan, a builder who meets the program's requirements of financial responsibility, tech-
nical competence, and fair dealings with consumers may obtain insurance for the home
buyer at a cost of $2 per $1,000 in the final sales price; for example, $80 for a S40,000




purchasers from lender-vendors. 100 The "regularly engaged" restric-
tion should be eliminated from the Washington implied warranty for
new houses.
E. Nature of the Warranty
1. The house must be habitable
The implied warranty is one of habitability covering major struc-
tural defects.' 0 ' The concept of habitability is expressed in Klos v.
Gockel as follows:
As a final matter, we note that the house was habitable at all times.
The gist of the implied warranty is that the resulting building will be
fit for its intended use, i.e., habitation .... In the instant case, the
only damage to the structure was the slight separation of the alumi-
num door frame from the wall of the house. Neither this nor the buck-
ling and sinking of the front yard patio slabs affect the habitability of
the house, and are not structural defects affecting habitability ....
The respondents never moved out of the house and were still occupy-
ing it at the time of trial. 10 2
The court's reference to the fact that plaintiffs did not move out is sig-
nificant. Though the court did not acknowledge appellant's claim that
moving out is the "acid test" of habitability, 103 it did rely upon the
failure to move as additional evidence of habitability. This reliance
suggests that moving out may become a requirement for proving unin-
habitability. 04
100. For example, a lending institution which foreclosed a builder's interest and
finished 95% of the construction would be a builder-vendor and the subsequent sale
would be commercial. A buyer would be deprived, however, of warranty protection be-
cause the lender would not be "regularly engaged" in the building business (assuming
that the lender did not make a practice of foreclosing and finishing construction). With-
out such a limitation, the lender probably would be subject to the warranty. See Note,
53 DEN. LJ. 413, 431-32 (1976). See also Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 247 (1971).
101. Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wn. 2d at 570, 554 P.2d at 1352.
102. Id. at 571, 554 P.2d at 1352-53.
103. Brief for Appellant at 15, Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wn. 2d 567, 554 P.2d 1349
(1976)(appellant contended "that the acid test of whether a new house is unfit for occu-
pancy is whether the buyer moves out").
104. Such a result would be unfortunate. First, it would contradict Washington de-
cisions dealing with the warranty of habitability. For instance, in House v. Thornton, 76
Wn. 2d 428, 457 P.2d 199 (1969), the plaintiffs lived with the defects for 23 months be-
fore bringing suit. The court found the house to be uninhabitable without specifying
whether or not the plaintiffs ever moved out. The same approach was used in Gay v.
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This conclusion is weakened by Allen v. Anderson, an appellate
case following Klos in which the building was occupied at the time of
trial.1 05 The case was remanded for findings of fact on several issues,
but whether plaintiff was forced to move out was not among them.
Regardless of a "move-out" requirement, a working definition of
"habitable" remains to be formulated. Does it mean livable, in the
sense that humans can survive within the house, or, for example, "rea-
sonably comfortable"? Since the warranty is supposed to insure the
house is fit for its intended purpose,10 6 the "reasonably comfortable"
standard is more logical because the average buyer expects to be rea-
sonably comfortable in a new house. This proposition was suggested,
in dictum at least, in one Washington opinion. 10 7 The problem with
the standard is its lack of definiteness. 10 8
Cornwall, 6 Wn. App. 595, 494 P.2d 1371 (1972).
In the landlord-tenant area, breach of the implied warranty of habitability is a defense
to an unlawful detainer action. Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wn. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973).
Thus, by definition, the tenant is living in the house while in court claiming it is legally
uninhabitable. Although the tenant is required to move out to 'alidate a claim of con-
structive eviction, that doctrine is not strictly tied to the concept of habitability. There
are situations in which the tenant may prove constructive eviction without proving ac-
tual uninhabitability. See Stoebuck, The Law Between Landlord and Tenant in Wash-
inglon: Part 1, 49 WASH. L. REv. 291, 348 (1974) (landlord's violation of a lease
covenant granting tenant an exclusive right can constitute constructive eviction).
Moving out is not a requirement in other jurisdictions which recognize an implied
warranty of habitability in new homes. In Griffin v. Wheeler-Leonard & Co., 290 N.C.
185, 225 S.E.2d 557, 567 (1976), the court stated that breach of the warranty could be
found from structural defects and failure to meet the workmanlike standard, regardless
of whether the livability of the house was affected. See note 113 infra. Similarly, in El-
derkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 288 A.2d 771,773 n.8 (1972), the court found a breach of
the warranty while noting that, "[a] s of the time of trial, appellants continued to live in
their... home." Id. For other cases which apply the implied warranty of habitability and
do not appear to require the owners to move out, see Elmore v. Blume, 31 II1. App.3d
643, 334 N.E. 2d 431 (1975); Barnes v. MacBrown & Co., 342 N.E. 2d 619 (Ind. 1976);
Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972).
105. Brief of Respondent at 7, Allen v. Anderson, 16 Wn. App. 446, 557 P.2d 24
(1976).
106. Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wn. 2d at 571, 554 P.2d at 1352.
107. In Berg v. Stromme, 79 Wn. 2d 184, 484 P.2d 380 (1971), a new car warranty
case in which the holding of House v. Thornton, 76 Wn. 2d 428, 457 P.2d 199 (1969),
was discussed, the court said, "When the foundation and substructure of the house
proved to be so defective and inadequate that it could not be occupied by its first pur-
chaser with reasonable safety and comfort, we imposed a rule of strict liability ....
79 Wn. 2d at 196, 484 P.2d at 396 (emphasis added).
108. One could argue that the standard is unworkable, since courts will necessarily
differ in their interpretation of reasonable comfort. A similarly undefined standard,
currently and apparently successfully, exists in the Uniform Commercial Code's im-
plied warranty of merchantability. WASH. CODE § 62A.2-314(2)(a)-(b) (1976). The
Code broadly defines "merchantable" as those goods which can "pass without objection
in the trade," and which are of "fair average quality." Id.
All the terms are actually synonymous. The average person should be reasonably
comfortable in a house of fair average quality, one that could pass without objection in
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2. Implied warranty of habitability andlor workmanlike quality?
In Klos v. Gockel,10 9 the court appeared to offer only one war-
ranty, that of habitability. 110 Yet in defining that warranty, the court
also included the distinguishable warranty"' of workmanlike qual-
ity.112 If this warranty were deemed to operate independently of the
warranty of habitability, builder-vendor liability would be expanded;
a house built in an unworkmanlike manner would breach the work-
manship warranty though it might not breach the warranty of habita-
bility." 3 This result is reached in several jurisdictions." 4
the trade. This conclusion argues for the adoption of an implied warranty of merchanta-
bility, rather than the implied warranty of habitability, in the new house area. See Part
IV-E-4 infra.
109. 87 Wn. 2d 567, 554 P.2d 1349 (1976).
110. Id. The court spoke of "the" implied warranty of habitability, and said "such
warranty" was explained in a quotation which included the workmanlike standard. Id.
at 570, 554 P.2d at 1352. Accord, Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev. Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 154
N.W.2d 803, 809 (1967) (court spoke of "an implied warranty of reasonable workman-
ship and habitability"). Other courts have treated them as separate and distinct warran-
ties. For example, in Carpenter v. Donahoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964), the
court said "there are implied warranties that the home was built in a workmanlike man-
ner and is suitable for habitation." 388 P.2d at 402 (emphasis added). This comment
will continue to use the singular form when referring to the Washington warranty as it is
not clear that the court intends multiple warranties. See note 7 supra.
I 1l. Warranties of habitability and workmanlike quality are not identical. A house
can be uninhabitable yet be built in a workmanlike manner. For example, in House v.
Thornton, 76 Wn. 2d 428, 457 P.2d 199 (1969), the court found "there was no proof that
the defendants failed to properly design and erect the building, or that they used defec-
tive materials or in any respect did an unworkmanlike job ...." Id. at 435, 457 P.2d at
203. Yet the home was held to be uninhabitable because it was built on unstable land
which caused failure of the foundation. The builder-vendors knew of the instability but
did not tell the buyer because the city engineer indicated the land had stabilized. Id. at
429, 457 P.2d at 200.
112. Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wn. 2d at 570, 554 P.2d at 1352, quoted at note 39 supra.
The standard of workmanlike quality was also included in the implied warranty of hab-
itability found in the construction contract in Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 52 Wn. 2d
at 833, 329 P.2d at 476. Accord, e.g., Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 NJ. 70, 207 A.2d
314(1965).
113. For example, an unworkmanlike application of interior paint would breach
the warranty of workmanlike quality but the habitability of the house would not be af-
fected. The argument that Washington recognizes an independent implied warranty of
workmanlike quality was made in the appellants' brief in Allen. Brief for Appellants at
15-21, Allen v. Anderson, 16 Wn. App. 446, 557 P.2d 24 (1976). The court did not
comment upon it.
114. In Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 648 (1974), the structure was habitable but built in an unworkmanlike manner.
The court imposed a warranty of quality, stating that "we conclude that builders and
sellers of new construction should be held to what is impliedly represented-that the
completed structure was designed and constructed in a reasonably workmanlike man-
ner." Id. at 380, 525 P.2d at 91, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 651.
Similarly, in Griffin v. Wheeler-Leonard & Co., 290 N.C. 185, 225 S.E.2d 557
(1976), the court said that, "the jury could find the house was neither free from major
structural defects nor constructed in a workmanlike manner .... Failure to meet this
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It is not clear whether Washington courts would reach such a re-
sult. Though Klos mentioned the warranty of workmanlike quality,
neither it nor prior Washington decisions have founded builder-ven-
dor liability on that basis."15 However, a post-Klos appellate decision,
Allen v. Anderson,l16 did authorize such liability."17
Because it is not clear that the Allen conclusion is sanctioned by the
Washington Supreme Court, clarification is appropriate. The Wash-
ington new house warranty should either be acknowledged as contain-
ing separate warranties of habitability and workmanlike quality, or
clarified by eliminating ambiguous references to workmanlike qual-
ity. Inclusion of both warranties is preferable."18
standard would constitute a breach of the implied warranty regardless of whether the
house could be deemed 'livable.' " 225 S.E.2d at 567 (emphasis added).
115. In KIos, 87 Wn. 2d 567, 571, 554 P.2d 1349, 1352 (1976), the court stated that
the "gist" of the warranty was habitability. Thus, slight structural damage and a buckled
patio did not breach the warranty because they did not affect habitability. Id. If the court
considered the warranty of workmanlike quality to operate independently of the habita-
bility warranty, a discussion of whether or not the defects were caused by substandard
work would have been necessary. Such discussion is absent.
Similarly, the warranty used in House v. Thornton, 76 Wn. 2d 428, 457 P.2d 199
(1969), contained standards of habitability and workmanlike quality. The House court
extended the implied warranty found in the construction contracts in Hoye v. Century
Builders, Inc.. 52 Wn. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958), and Fain v. Nelson, 57 Wn. 2d 217.
356 P.2d 302 (1960), which insured that the work would be done in a workmanlike man-
ner, and that the building would be habitable. For the warranty definition adopted in
Hove, see note 3 supra. Similarly, only habitability was emphasized in House v. Thorn-
ton. The coui-t stated that defects could exist, but unless they rendered the house uninha-
bitable, they would not be covered by the warranty. 76 Wn. 2d at 434, 457 P.2d at 203.
It should be noted that the court misstated the holding in Fain v. Nelson, 57 Wn. 2d 217,
356 P.2d 302 (1960), to reach this conclusion. In Fain, a defective roof was not covered
by the warranty because it was completed at the time of purchase, and thus the doctrine
of caveat emptor applied. Id. at 221-22, 356 P.2d at 305-06 (by implication). The fact
that the roof was reparable and did not render the house uninhabitable was not dis-
cussed.
The standard of habitability was again emphasized in Gay v. Cornwall, 6 Wn. App.
595, 599, 494 P.2d 1371, 1374 (1972). There, the house fell well below the workmanlike
quality standard. The chimney was improperly flashed, the plumbing was defective in
materials and installation, vents were not connected, gutters were too short, the drain-
field was inadequate, and the external paint was too thin. Id. at 597, 494 P.2d at 1372-
73. Nevertheless, the court based its decision on the fact that the defects rendered the
house uninhabitable. Id. at 598, 494 P.2d at 1374. The more obvious breach of the war-
ranty of workmanlike quality was not mentioned.
116. 16 Wn. App. 446, 557 P.2d 24(1976).
117. Jury instruction number nine was challenged for stating that buildings must
comply with building codes. Id. at 448, 557 P.2d at 26. The court approved the instruc-
tion because it found "support in Kios." Id. Such support would have to stem from the
statement in Kios that the warranty included a standard of workmanlike quality, be-
cause Kios did not mention building codes, and the below-code defects in Allen did not
render the building uninhabitable. The building was fully rented at the time of trial.
Brief for Respondents at 5-7, Allen v. Anderson, 16 Wn. App. 446, 557 P.2d 24 (1976).
118. In other areas of the law, the offeror of goods or services is held accountable
for defective quality even if the goods are still usable. For example, the builder under a
208
New Home Warranty
3. The defects must be major and structural
Klos v. Gockel119 limited the new house implied warranty to ma-
jor 120 structural' 2 ' defects in the dwelling and fixtures. 22 This limita-
tion to structural defects is inconsistent with the trend in other
jurisdictions123 and with the earlier Washington decision in Gay v.
construction contract must build a house which is both habitable and built in a work-
manlike manner. See Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 52 Wn. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474(1958). Similarly, the manufacturer of a car must produce one which is workable and of
average new-car quality in all other respects. For example, a dent in the door would not
affect workability, but would breach the warranty of quality. See WASH. REV. CODE §
62A.2-314 (1976). Other jurisdictions have used this principle in the new house war-
ranty -area. Builders are liable for breaches of the workmanlike quality standard even if
the house is found to be habitable. See Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d
374, 525 P.2d 88, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1974); Griffin v. Wheeler-Leonard & Co., 290
N.C. 185, 225 S.E.2d 557 (1976).
119. 87 Wn. 2d 567, 554 P.2d 1349 (1976).
120. Id. at 570, 554 P.2d at 1352. The Klos court did not emphasize this element.
However, the court of appeals'did in the later case of Gunnar v. Brice, 17 Wn. App.
819, 565 P.2d 1212 (1977). That case involved an action for constructive fraud by non-
disclosure of defects in a used house. To recover, the plaintiffs had to prove, among
other things, that the defeats were material. Though distinguishable, Klos is cited as sup-
porting that concept, id. at 824, 565 P.2d at 1215, presumably because of its declaration
that defects must be major. For further discussion, see notes 137-38 and accompanying
text infra.
121. "Structural" is defined as "of or relating to the load-bearing members or
scheme of a building as opposed to the screening or ornamental elements, [e.g., the
structural parts] of a house consist of floor joists, rafters, wall and partition studs, sup-
porting columns ... foundations ... ." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL Dic-
TIONARY 2266 (P. Gove ed. 1961). A definition used in the building trade coincides with
the above definition:[A] major structural defect is actual damage to the load-bearing portion of the
home-including damage due to settling, expansion, or lateral movement of the
soil-which affects its load-bearing function and vitally affects its use for residen-
tial purposes .... Examples of possible major structural defects are: Major weak-
ening in the home's foundation .... Failure of beams, joists... or other elements of
the home's supporting structure .... Major structural problems in roofs, such as
failure of its structural members.
Home Owners Warranty Corp., supra note 57, at 6. In the HOW warranty itself, such
defects are termed "major construction defects." Id. at 18. Since the definition is the
same, however, the terms are synonymous.
122. In Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wn. 2d at 570, 554 P.2d at 1352, the court stated that,
"[t] he dwelling, together with all its fixtures [must be] sufficiently free from major
structural defects .... Examples of cases in which the warranty has been applied to fix-
tures are Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11, 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (applying the war-
ranty to an air conditioning system but classifying the system as "realty") and Schipper
v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965) (alternate holding). For a discussion
of how the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act affects fixture warranties, see Peters, supra
note 80.
123. Though the court in Hartley v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 51, 209 S.E.2d 776 (1974)(cited by the Klos court to explain the warranty), spoke of "major structural defects,"
the case is interpreted in its own jurisdiction to be devoid of that limitation. In Lyon v.
Ward, 28 N.C. App. 446, 221 S.E.2d 727 (1976) (a nonstructural, defective well is
within the warranty protection), the court said, "[W] e interpret Hartley to stand for the
proposition that a builder-vendor impliedly warrants to the initial purchaser that a
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Cornwall.124 In that case nonstructural as well as structural defects
rendered the house uninhabitable.12 5 This result can be reconciled
with the Klos limitation if the definition of structural is expanded to
include all items reasonably essential to the use of the house.126
The most compelling argument for this expansion is one of policy.
In Foisy v. Wyman,' 27 the court declared:
Any realistic analysis of the lessor-lessee or landlord-tenant situation
leads to the conclusion that the tenant's promise to pay rent is in ex-
change for the landlord's promise to provide a livable dwelling....
"When American city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek 'shelter' to-
day, they seek a well known package . . . which includes not merely
walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and ventilation, ser-
house and all its fixtures will provide the service or protection for which it was intended
under normal use and conditions." 221 S.E.2d at 729. For other cases in which the war-
ranty has covered nonstructural items, see Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co.. 12 Cal. 3d
374, 525 P.2d 88, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1974) (sticking glass doors and poor patio drain-
age as well as sagging ceilings, were considered to be defects); Griffin v. Wheeler-Leon-
ard & Co., 290 N.C. 185, 225 S.E.2d 557 (1976) (failure of top window sashes to stay up
and water underneath the garage door after heavy rains were among the defects
considered); Yepsen v. Burgess, 269 Or. 635, 525 P.2d 1019 (1974) (defects included
septic tank and drainage system); Elderkin v. Gaster. 447 Pa. 188, 288 A.2d 771 (1972)
(though the house and well were structurally sound, the defective water quality rendered
the house uninhabitable).
124. 6 Wn. App. 595, 494 P.2d 1371 (1972). The Supreme Court, in Klos v. Gockel.
87 Wn. 2d 567, 554 P.2d 1349 (1976). reached a result inconsistent with the appellate
holding in Gay without mentioning or distinguishing Gay.
125. Gay v. Cornwall, 6 Wn. App. at 596, 494 P.2d at 1372-73. The defects in-
cluded a leaky roof and chimney; electricity, plumbing, and heating problems; raw sew-
age; and a defective driveway drainfield. The court did not distinguish between struc-
tural and nonstructural items. Rather, it determined that as a whole, the defects
rendered the house uninhabitable.
126. See Yepsen v. Burgess, 269 Or. 635, 525 P.2d 1019, 1023 (1974). Accord,
Lyon v. Ward, 28 N.C. App. 446, 221 S.E.2d 727, 729 (1976) (by implication). One
could argue that the Klos court actually intended this definition. It cited two cases which
involved defective septic tanks, technically nonstructural items, to illustrate uninhabit-
able houses. Moreover, the court did not object to the inclusion of nonstructural defects
in Gay v. Cornwall, 6 Wn. App. 595, 494 P.2d 1371 (1972). Klos limited the warranty
to major structural defects, however, so such a conclusion is inadvisable.
The Home Owners Warranty Corporation's written warranty-insurance program, by
dividing its coverage, provides protection to all items reasonably essential to the use of
the home. Major structural defects are covered for ten years; the plumbing, electrical,
heating, and cooling systems are covered for two years; and defects listed in the "Ap-
proved Standards" section which covers a broad range including minor defects such as
malfunctioning kitchen cabinets, are covered for one year. Home Owners Warranty
Corp., supra note 57, at 25-32. Under the suggested implied warranty formulation,
many of these latter defects, those listed in the "Approved Standards," would not be
covered. They would not be reasonably essential to the use of the home, or might be too
minor to invoke the warranty. This result is consistent with the purpose of the implied
warranty, to provide basic protection for buyers. Those desiring fuller protection have
recourse by demanding expanded written warranties.
127. 83Wn. 2d22,515P.2d 160(1973).
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viceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors, proper sanita-
tion, and proper maintenance."' 128
An even stronger argument can be made that a buyer's willingness
to contract is in exchange for the seller's promise to provide a livable
dwelling, a package which includes not merely structural integrity,
but nonstructural integrity as well, such as adequate heating, lighting,
and plumbing. It is illogical to extend nonstructural protection to the
$100-a-month tenant, but not to the buyer of a $100,000 house. 129
This protection may be provided in Washington despite the Klos
restriction. In Allen v. Anderson,'30 nonstructural items were in-
cluded among the defects listed by the court.13' Without explanation,
the Allen court ignored Klos and adopted the more liberal coverage
contemplated by the decision in Gay v. Cornwall.132
4. Implied warranty of merchantability
A solution to the problems created by the structural and habitabil-
ity limitations is provided by characterizing the warranty as one of
merchantability133 rather than one of habitability. Using the Uniform
Commercial Code by analogy, the builder-vendor 34 would guarantee
128. Id. at 27, 515 P.2d at 164.
129. In addition to having less at stake, tenants of used buildings have fewer expec-
tations of soundness than do buyers of new homes.
130. 16 Wn. App. 446, 557 P.2d 24 (1976).
131. Id. The defects included a cupped roof which prevented normal drainage,
storm and sanitary drains which should not have been connected to the city sewer sys-
tem, inadequate brick veneer work, inadequate retaining walls, and an inadequate
foundation.
132. 6 Wn. App. 595, 494 P.2d 1371 (1972). See notes 124-25 and accompanying
text supra.
133. The "warranty of merchantability" is a better term than the currently used la-
bel, "warranty of fitness." The warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is designed
for extraordinary purposes: "A 'particular purpose' differs from the ordinary purpose
for which the goods are used in that it envisages a specific use by the buyer which is pe-
culiar to the nature of his business whereas the ordinary purposes ... go to uses which
are customarily made of the goods .... ."WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.2-315, Com-
ment 2 (1966). As the ordinary and customary purpose of most home buyers is to live in
the home, merchantability, rather than fitness, is the more appropriate label. Further-
more, to establish breach of the implied warranty of fitness, the buyer must prove that he
relied on the seller's superior skill and judgment, and that the seller knew of such
reliance. WASH. REV. CODE 62A.2-3 15 (1976). On the other hand, the warranty of mer-
chantability requires no showing of reliance, and thus is more appropriate to housing
sales, where typically the seller does not know whether or not the buyer is specifically re-
lying on his judgment.
134. Builder-vendor recourse against the supplier of building plans or materials is
beyond the scope of this comment. See note 3 supra.
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that, upon sale,135 the house would be of fair average quality, that it
would pass without objection in the building trade, and that it would
be fit for the ordinary purpose of living in it.1 36
This warranty would suit the expectations and needs of both par-
ties. The buyer would be protected against extraordinary, major,137
structural and nonstructural defects, while the seller would not be ac-
countable for ordinary, minor defects. Some courts have already
moved in this direction. 138
F. Duration of the Warranty
Opinions on the duration of the implied warranty for new houses
135. Defects stemming from post-sale events can operate as a defense:
In an action based on breach of warranty, it is of course necessary to show not only
the existence of the warranty but the fact that the warranty was broken and that the
breach of the warranty was the proximate cause of the loss sustained. In such an ac-
tion an affirmative showing by the seller that the loss resulted from some action or
event following his own delivery of the goods can operate as a defense.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.2-314. Comment 13 (1966).
136. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-314 (1976) states:
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the descrip-
tion; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; ....
In addition, the draftsmen's comment explains that, "[p]aragraphs (a) and (b) of
subsection (2) are to be read together . . . . 'Fair average' . .. means goods centering
around the middle belt of quality, not the least or the worst ... but such as can pass
Iwithout objection.'" WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.2-314, Comment 7 (1966). Cf.
Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803, 809 (1967) (standard
is reasonableness, not perfection).
This concept of "average quality" would provide the specifics which should be in-
cluded within an implied warranty, but which would amount to a laundry list if they
were so included. For example, jurisdictions which specifically include compliance with
local building codes in their warranties would no longer need to do so, for the average
new house should comply with such codes. See Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388
P.2d 399 (1965). The inclusion of building code compliance in the Model Statutory
Warranty, however, is done for purposes of clarity and emphasis. See note 167 and ac-
companying text infra.
137. This aspect coincides with the Kios warranty which is presently limited to "ma-
jor structural defects." Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wn. 2d at 570, 554 P.2d at 1352.
138. See Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 648 (1974); Wright v. Creative Corp., 30 Colo. App. 575, 498 P.2d 1179 (1972);
Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d II (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Smith v. Old Warson Dev.
Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 NJ. 70, 207 A.2d 314.
326 (1965) (court states that "comparable" warranty to new-house implied warranty is
implied warranty of merchantability); Yepsen v. Burgess, 269 Or. 635, 525 P.2d 1019
(1974); Rothberg v. Olenik, 128 Vt. 306, 262 A.2d 461, 467 (1970) (court saw no reason




vary. 139 In Washington, R.C.W. § 4.16.310140 provides a six-year
statute of limitations for all actions brought under R.C.W. § 4.16.-
300,141 which "applies to all claims or causes of action of any kind"
brought against a builder. 142 An identical statute of limitations applies
to actions against nonbuilder sellers. 143
139. In model legislation presented by Professor Bearman, the warranty is fixed at
one year:
One year represents a full seasonal cycle and should bring out all defects in exis-
tence at the time of the deed, or, in case of an installment purchase, at the time ven-
dee took possesson. Defects which manifest themselves later are much more likely
due to ordinary wear and tear or the elements.
Bearman, supra note 43, at 576. Professor Haskell, on the other hand, recommends a
five-year warranty as a workable period which does not burden the seller with eternal
contingent liability. Haskell, supra note 25, at 651-52. Both of these views are rejected
by still another commentator who feels that a fixed period is too inflexible and that in-
stead a standard of reasonableness should be utilized. Williams, Development in Ac-
lions for Breach of Implied Warranties of Habitability in the Sale of New Houses, 10
TuLSA L.J. 445, 448 (1975). Accord, Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795,
801 (Mo. 1972); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803, 809
(1967). This standard has been adopted in at least two jurisdictions. See Barnes v. Mac
Brown & Co., 432 N.E.2d 619, 620 (Ind. 1976); Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275,
1282 (Wyo. 1975).
140. The statute provides:
All claims or causes of action as set forth in RCW 4.16.300 shall accrue, and the ap-
plicable statute of limitations shall begin to run only during the period within six
years after substantial completion of construction, or during the period within six
years after the termination of the services enumerated in RCW 4.16.300, whichever
is later. The phrase "substantial completion of construction" shall mean the state of
completion reached when an improvement upon real property may be used or oc-
cupied for its intended use. Any cause of action which has not accrued within six
years after such substantial completion of construction, or within six years after
such termination of services, whichever is later, shall be barred: Provided, that this
limitation shall not be asserted as a defense by any owner, tenant or other person in
possession and control of the improvement at the time such cause of action accrues.
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.310 (1976).
141. The statute provides:
RCW 4.16.300 through 4.16.320 shall apply to all claims or causes of action of any
kind against any person, arising from such person having constructed, altered or
repaired any improvement upon real property, or having performed or furnished
any design, planning, surveying, architectural or construction or engineering ser-
vices, or supervision or observation of construction, or administration of construc-
tion contracts for any construction, alteration or repair of any improvement upon
real property.
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.300 (1976).
142. However, the six-year period does not apply to actions already governed by a
shorter statute of limitations. R.C.W. § 4.16.320 states: "Nothing in RCW 4.16.300
through 4.16.320 shall be construed as extending the period now permitted by law for
bringing any kind of action." WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.320 (1976).
143. Actions against nonbuilder sellers, sellers who hire builders, appear to be con-
trolled by R.C.W. § 4.16.040(2). It provides a six-year statute of limitations for "[a] n
action upon a contract in writing, or liability express or implied arising out of a written
agreement." WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.040(2) (1976). One could argue, however, that ac-
tions against nonbuilder sellers are controlled by R.C.W. § 4.16.300. quoted at note 141
supra. Though it seems designed to encompass only builders and others actively in-
volved in the construction process, such as architects and lending institutions, non-
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It is arguable that a variable period limited by a standard of reason-
ableness144 would provide a better method of judging how long a
builder-vendor should be subject to liability than would the fixed stat-
utory period. A foundation, for example, could crack in the seventh
year, and while suit would be barred in Washington, it might not be
barred in a jurisdiction using a "reasonable period" standard.
Nevertheless, Washington's six-year statutory period appears ade-
quate. Approximately ninety-five percent of housing defects appear
within the first year, and the remainder normally appear within the
six-year limit. 145 Thus the statutory period effectively protects most
buyers while allowing builders to avoid burdensome "eternal" liabil-
ity.
G. Disclaimers
Although the Washington courts have not had the opportunity to
decide whether disclaimers of the new house implied warranty should
be allowed, the issue merits consideration. Initially, the courts must
decide if disclaimers contravene public policy.146 A Washington court
determined that they did in the landlord-tenant area. 147 Courts faced
builder sellers might be included because the law applies to any person in "supervision
or observation of construction." Id. It is conceivable that this phrase could be used to
encompass nonbuilder sellers since the overall intent of the law appears to be that of
limiting all suits, directly or indirectly connected to builders, to six years.
144. Some jurisdictions reject a fixed period and use a standard of reasonableness
to judge the time during which a builder-vendor remains liable. See note 139 supra.
145. Interview with Stan Mitchell, architect and building inspector, in Seattle.
Washington (December 29, 1977).
146. Professor Haskell maintains:
A forceful argument can also be made for the proposition that any disclaimer of fit-
ness for habitation in the sale of new construction is unconscionable and against
public policy. Should a merchant be permitted to build and receive money for a
structure which appears to be a house ... and avoid liability in the event the struc-
ture has a material defect?
Haskell, supra note 25, at 654.
147. In Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wn. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973), the court decided that
a tenant should not be able to agree to live in uninhabitable premises as they are a health
hazard, not only to the individual tenant, "but to the community which is exposed to
said individual .... [S] uch housing conditions are at least a contributing cause of such
problems as urban blight, juvenile delinquency and high property taxes for the conscien-
tious landowners." Id. at 28, 515 P.2d at 164. Whether the court would reach a similar
conclusion when faced with defects in housing outside the landlord-tenant area is un-
clear. Arguably uninhabitability, whether it be in a rented or purchased house. is the
crucial issue. Thus, since it harmfully affects the community, buyers, as well as tenants,
should not be allowed to agree to live in uninhabitable premises. If the warranty is ex-
tended beyond habitability to breaches of the workmanlike quality standard, however,
disclaimers might be appropriate because the effect on the community would not be as
substantial. See Part IV-E-2 supra.
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with the issue in the new house context have found disclaimers to be
valid148 if the language clearly and unambiguously illustrates the in-
tention of both parties to disclaim the implied warranty. 149 Essen-
tially, the courts apply a reasonable person standard by asking
whether a reasonable person would have intended the disclaimer
clause to waive his right to recovery for unknown, latent defects. 50
Washington law' 5 ' suggests by analogy that a valid disclaimer
should be written, 52 conspicuous, and should include the term "mer-
chantability."'153 In addition, the disclaimer must be explicitly negoti-
ated 54 and detail the particular items which are not being war-
148. In Conyers v. Molloy, 364 N.E.2d 986 (Ill. 1977), the court declared, 'The
public policy of Illinois does not prohibit a waiver or disclaimer of an implied warranty
of habitability if such renunciation is sufficiently specific to adequately apprise the bu-
yer of what he is waiving." Id. at 990. Accord, Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1972); Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972); Griffin v.
Wheeler-Leonard & Co., 270 N.C. 185, 225 S.E.2d 557 (1976). See generally Roberts,
The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did It, 52 CORNELL L.Q.
835 (1967).
149. Conyers v. Molloy, 364 N.E.2d 986, 989 (II1. 1977); Griffin v. Wheeler-Leon-
ard & Co., 290 N.C. 185, 225 S.E.2d 567, 568 (1976); Casavant v. Campopiano, 114
R.I. 24, 327 A.2d 831, 834 (1974). But see Tibbets v. Openshaw, 18 Utah 2d 442, 425
P.2d 160 (1967).
150. See Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972). Accord,
Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922, 926 (1970) (by implication).
151. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act supersedes state law governing disclaim-
ers concerning consumer goods, whenever a written warranty is given. A seller giving a
written warranty cannot disclaim the implied warranty. For a complete discussion of
the Act's effect on new housing, see Peters, supra note 80.
152. WASH. REV. CODE § 64.04.010 (1976) requires every conveyance of real estate
to be in deed form. In Langert v. Ross, I Wash. 250, 24 P.443 (1890), the court allowed
a written memorandum, rather than a deed, to satisfy this requirement.
153. WASH. REv. CODE § 62A.2-316(2) (1976). In MacDonald v. Mobley, 555
S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), the court applied the Texas Uniform Commercial
Code disclaimer rules to disclaimers of new house implied warranties. Possibly the §
62A.2-316(2) requirements of conspicuousness and express reference to merchantabil-
ity are not mandatory. Subsection (3) states that "notwithstanding" subsection (2), and
"unless the circumstances indicate otherwise," the implied warranty can be disclaimed
by language which makes plain the lack of a warranty. WASH. REV. CODE § 62.A.2-
316(3) (1976). The inconspicuous, yet plain, disclaimer of an expensive item such as a
house, however, might be just the circumstance which would indicate that the require-
ments of subsection (2), rather than (3), are met. In Macdonald v. Mobley, 555 S.W.2d
at 919, the court relied on the Texas equivalent of subsection (2) and invalidated the dis-
claimer because it was not conspicuous, although the disclaimer purportedly met the
equivalent of Washington's subsection (3) requirements. Contra, Conyers v. Molloy, 7
Ill. App. 3d 695, 364 N.E.2d 986, 989 (1977) (the court erroneously substituted the dis-
claimer requirements of the implied warranty of fitness for the implied warranty of
merchantability).
154. Berg v. Stromme, 79 Wn. 2d 184, 196, 484 P.2d 380, 386 (1971). Although this
case dealt with disclaimers of new car implied warranties, the court used House by anal-
ogy to reach its decision. Id.See also Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 16 Wn.
App. 39, 554 P.2d 349 (1976).
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ranted.1 55 This test should also govern clauses which attempt to limit
remedies1 56 and warranty clauses contained in listing and earnest
money agreements. 157
V. CONCLUSION
The present Washington implied warranty of habitability for new
houses should be modified to become an implied warranty of mer-
chantability covering both structural and nonstructural components.
The warranty should be imposed in all commercial sales of new con-
struction and should cover all items sold by the builder-vendor. In ad-
dition, the warranty should run to the first purchaser-occupant and/or
the initial vendee and to all subsequent buyers who purchase within
the warranty period.
Furthermore, the Washington courts should clarify the nature of
the warranty. Breaches which violate the workmanlike quality stan-
155. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-3 16(4) (1976). This provision applies only to goods
purchased primarily for "personal, family, or household use." Id. The house itself, by
analogy, ought to fit within its scope.
156. See Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, 86 Wn. 2d 256, 544 P.2d 20 (1975) ("con-
spicuousness" and "the presence of negotiation" are relevant in defining an unconscion-
able restriction of remedy).
157. Just as disclaimer clauses are contrary to the buyer's expectations, these war-
ranty clauses are contrary to those of the sellers. For example, the seller of a used house
ordinarily warrants nothing. However, the Eastside Brokers Association. Inc..
Exclusive Sale and Listing Agreement includes a statement that, "Seller warrants that
there is nothing about the property (including any improvements and structures) that
needs repair, replacement or attention except ...." Eastside Brokers Ass'n. Inc., Form
100 (Dec. 1, 1976) (emphasis added). The clause is not limited to the seller's knowledge
and therefore creates tremendous potential liability. If the property has a defect and the
agent, because of the clause, represented it as defect free, the seller would be liable to
the realtor on the warranty given.
Direct liability to the buyer could be established through the use of the Real Estate
Purchase and Sale Agreement. In the fine, pale print on the back of the page, this clause
appears: "Seller warrants that the septic tank serving the property: (1) is in good work-
ing order and seller has no knowledge of any needed repairs; and (2) Meets all applica-
ble Governmental health, construction and other standards." Eastside Brokers Ass'n,
Inc., Burroughs Business Forms I (June 1977) (emphasis added). The average seller
would be unaware of this clause and have no idea whether or not his septic tank met
governmental standards.
To be valid, these clauses should meet the basic standards set for disclaimer clauses.
They should be conspicuous and explicitly negotiated. Such negotiation might be en-
couraged by decisions like Wegg v. Henry Broderick, Inc., 16 Wn. App. 589, 557 P.2d
861 (1976). There, the court imposed liability upon the defendant brokerage firm, partly




dard, as well as breaches affecting habitability, should be clearly ac-
knowledged as invoking warranty protection. 58
APPENDIX: MODEL WARRANTY
To facilitate the development of warranties in the building indus-
try, the following model statutory warranty is offered.159
STATUTORY WARRANTY FOR NEW BUILDINGS
Section 1. DEFINITIONS. As used in this chapter:
(1) "Purchaser" means a person who contracts to purchase a new
building for fair consideration, or a mortgage lender or deed-of-trust
beneficiary who takes pos'session of said building.160 "Purchaser" in-
cludes all purchasers who contract within six years of the date on
which the deed passes or possession is taken, whichever occurs first.
(2) "Builder" means any person who constructs a new building on his
or another's property and:
(a) is an individual who deals in the construction trade or otherwise
by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill pecu-
liar to construction, or is a person who is a "general contractor" as de-
fined in R.C.W. § 18.27.0 10; or 161
(b) is an individual who does all work personally without employees
or is a specialty contractor as defined in R.C.W. § 18.27.010; or
(c) is an individual meeting the description of Section 1(2)(a) or (b)
who contracts for the construction in whole or in part of his own new
building and acts as his own general contractor.162
158. In addition, the Washington courts should clarify whether or not an implied
materials warranty is given by the builder-vendor, and whether or not builder-vendors
will be strictly liable for defects caused by others. For a discussion of these issues, see
note 3 supra.
159. A bill, considered by the Financial Institutions Committee of the Washington
House of Representatives, was used as the base for this model. Proposed Act Relating to
Home Warranties: Hearings on H-2603178 Before the House Financial Institutions
Committee, 45th Legislature (1978) (draft of proposed act on file with Washington Law
Review).
160. The bill protects investors who buy for resale, as well as purchaser-occupants.
161. The "Builder" definition is intended to encompass all builders who are en-
gaged in the business of building for profit. There is no requirement that the builder be
regularly engaged in the business; building one house for profit is sufficient to invoke
the warranty.
162. A professional builder offers the warranty even on houses built for personal
use, as he has the expertise to construct an adequate house and his buyer may justifiably
rely on that expertise. However, a nonprofessional, such as a layman constructing his
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(3) "Developer" means a person or corporation to whom a builder's
knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of said
builder to erect a building for purposes of sale.
16 3
(4) "Building" means all items constructed, subtracted, altered or re-
paired by the builder. "Building" does not include landscaping."
1 4
(5) "Trade" means the business of building, buying, and selling build-
ings for profit.
Section 2. WARRANTY. (1) (a) In every contract for the sale of a
completed new building, in every contract for the construction of a
new building, and
(b) in every contract for the alteration, repair, addition, subtraction,
or improvement of a new or used building, 165
(c) the builder and/or developer'"6 shall be held to warrant to the
purchaser that, at the time of the passing of the deed or of the pur-
chaser taking possession, or at the time the work done under (1)(b) of
this section is substantially completed, whichever occurs first, the
building, in the contract specified in (1)(a) of this section, and that
portion of the building worked on or damaged because of the contract
specified in (1)(b) of this section, together with all its fixtures:
(i) complies with all of the requirements of R.C.W. §§ 19.27 and
19.28 and any local amendments authorized thereby;16 7 and
(ii) is fit for its ordinary purpose; and'( 8
(iii) is constructed so as to pass without objection in the trade un-
der the contract description.16 9
own home, would not offer the warranty. He would not, by his occupation. hold himself
out as having construction expertise, and therefore buyer reliance upon such expertise
would be unjustified.
163. The "Developer" definition encompasses sellers who hire builders to erect
speculation buildings. Their liability stems from the creation of a product for the hous-
ing market. The definition excludes the seller who has a building erected for personal
use and subsequently decides to sell. Though this reliance on intent provides a loophole
for unscrupulous developers, the exemption is necessary to prevent the true layman
from becoming a "developer" simply by hiring a builder to erect his home.
164. The definition goes beyond the common law by covering not only the main
structure, a house for example, but also other items for which the builder is responsible
(fence, barn. patio, etc.). Landscaping is excluded because a builder does not "con-
struct" a lawn in the sense that he should be responsible for its failure to grow.
165. The bill encompasses new work done on used buildings such as kitchen remo-
deling, additions, and roof repairs.
166. For the purpose of simplicity, the bill imposes liability only upon the builder
and/or developer. It is assumed that the builder and/or developer will seek indemnity
from architects, materials suppliers, and owners. etc.. when such is appropriate.
167. The bill mandates compliance with applicable building codes.
168. Since the ordinary purpose of a home or apartment building is habitation.
there would be a warranty of habitability in dwellings.
169. The building must be generally acceptable in the building industry: it need not




This warranty survives the passage of the deed or the taking of posses-
sion by the initial vendee.17 0
(2) The warranty given in subsection (1) of this section shall be auto-
matically transferred to all subsequent purchasers of the building
within six years of the date on which the work done under (1)(b) of
this section is substantially completed, the deed passes, or the pur-
chaser takes possession.' 7 '
(3) The warranty given in subsection (1) of this section shall not apply
to loss caused by anything172 or anyone other than the developer,
builder, or his/their employees, agents, or subcontractors, or to loss
caused by normal wear and tear, deterioration, or acts of God.
Section 3. NOTICE. Notice, either oral or written, of breach of the
warranty given in Section 2 must be given to the party or parties sued
under this act within a reasonable time after the purchaser discovers
or should have discovered the breach.
Section 4. DISCLAIMERS. No agreement which purports to waive
any warranty given under Section 2 of this act shall be effective in
contracts for dwellings bought for personal habitation by one or two
families. Any authorized disclaimer of liability under Section 2 must
be in writing, explicitly negotiated between the contracting parties,
and must state with particularity the qualities and characteristics not
being warranted. 173
Section 5. CAUSE OF ACTION. In the event of a breach of any
warranty given under Section 2 of this act, the purchaser or his heirs
contract description" provides a basis for judging quality. For example, a two bedroom
house at $50,000 is presumably of lower quality than one at $80,000. This presumption
assumes the price differential is not due to outside considerations, such as the popularity
of the area in which the house is located.
170. There is no merger by deed.
17 1. The warranty runs with the house for six years.
172. The term "anything" encompasses all nonhuman acts for which the builder
should not be liable, such as termite infestation.
173. The bill assumes that the unsophisticated layman buying a home for personal
use needs the greatest protection. Thus, disclaimers are prohibited in such cases, both for
the buyer's and the community's protection. For a discussion of the detrimental effects
to the community caused by poor housing, see note 147 supra. The bill allows the inves-
tor who buys a rental house to waive the warranty. Upon renting, however, he will be
liable to his tenants on a warranty of habitability, so such a waiver will merely shift the
burden of providing minimal housing from the builder/developer to the buyer.
In the nonresidence context, disclaimers are allowed in the belief that the Section 2
warranty will not be greatly utilized. Most nonresidences are built under construction
contracts in which an implied warranty already exists. For those not built under con-




or personal representatives in case of his death, shall have a cause of
action against the builder and/or developer for damages. 17 4
Section 6. MEASURE OF DAMAGES. (1) The measure of dam-
ages for breach of the warranty given in Section 2 of this act shall be
the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of
the building accepted and the value it would have had if it had been as
warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a
different amount.
(2) In a proper case incidental and consequential damages may also be
recovered.
(a) Incidental damages include reasonable expenses incurred from
breach of the warranty, such as but not limited to, costs of inspection
and care.
(b) Consequential damages include any loss resulting from general
or particular requirements and needs of which the builder-vendor at
the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not rea-
sonably be prevented, and injury to person or property proximately
resulting from any breach of warranty.
(3) In a proper case rescission may be granted. 175
Section 7. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. No cause of action un-
der Section 5 of this act shall be maintained more than six years after
the date on which the work done under Section 2(l)(b) is substantially
completed, the deed passes, or the purchaser takes possession,
whichever occurs first.' 76
Section 8. ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS. In any action taken
under this chapter, the prevailing party may be awarded reasonable
attorneys' fees, plus costs.
Section 9. NONEXCLUSIVE. This chapter is nonexclusive and is in
addition to any other remedy available by law.
Holly Keesling Towle
174. The purchaser may sue the builder, the developer, or both. If only the dev-
eloper is sued, it is expected he will join the builder, as an implied warranty will exist in
the construction contract between them.
175. The verb "may" is used to indicate the rescission is discretionary with the
court.
176. The bill adopts the base period of six years used in the statutes which cover
suits against builders and sellers. It rejects, however, the statutes' designation for com-
mencement of the six-year period. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.16.040, .310 (1976). See gen-
erally notes 140-43 and accompanying text supra.
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